

A
TREATISE
Concerning
REVOLUTIONS
IN
KINGDOMS.

Translated from the *Italian* of *K*
OTTAVIO SAMMARCO,
Baron della Rocca d'Evandro, e di Camino.

Printed by Authority at Turin, Anno 1629.



LONDON,
Printed; And Sold by J. WILFORD, behind the
Chapter-House in *St. Paul's Church-yard*.

M. DCC. XXXI.

2055



Translated from the Italian of

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Printed by A. Levey at the Press of the British Museum



LONDON

Printed and Sold by J. W. Levey at the Press of the British Museum

M. DCCC. XLV.



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A

TREATISE
CONCERNING
REVOLUTIONS
IN
KINGDOMS.

CHAP. I.

*All States are subject to Revolutions,
particularly MONARCHY.*



ALL Governments are sub-
ject to *Change*, for they
have many Contrarieties
both intrinsical and ex-
trinsical: the Constituents
whereof burn with perpetual Emula-
tion, Envy, Jealousy and Ambition ;
B and

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and the State is harrafs'd with Hatred, Snares, Treasons, mutual Jars and Injuries. They procure one another's Distress and Ruin, and look upon it as their reciprocal Advantage and Preservation. The *Means of Tranquillity*, from which the Establishment of States proceed, are delicate, because they are expos'd to such various Accidents, depend on such distant Causes, meet at such dangerous Points of Time; and every living Thing, sooner or later, finishes its Course. How many have been the Changes of *Republicks*? How oft have *Kingdoms* submitted to other Forms of Government? How many *Empires* have been destroy'd? How many *Monarchies* ruin'd, and transferr'd from one *Nation* to another? Here Glory and Triumph have been supplanted by Slavery and Oppression: There Empire and Dignity have been succeeded by Shame and Confusion; and the Conquerors of so many Provinces and Kingdoms at once fear'd and obey'd by almost the whole World, have had their Laurels pluck'd from their Brows, and scarce retain a Name
among

among Mankind. What Prince can rid himself of the Discord and Jealousy of Neighbours, and the Misunderstandings of those at a greater Distance, or secure himself against the Violence of a Superior, the Suspicion of an Equal, or the Hatred of an Inferior? Who can guard against the Cabals of a factious Nobility, the Conspiracies of Subjects, the Insurrections of the Populace, the Differences that arise between him and his Relations, the Treachery of his Ministers, the Infidelity of his General Officers, the Desertions of the Soldiery, the Invasions of Foreigners, and the Inundations of barbarous Nations? A powerful Prince is transported, with a Presumption of superior Force, to embrace disproportionate Enterprizes, or through Negligence fails to give due Attention to Matters of Importance, and is prompted by Insolence to injure his Neighbours, whence comes his Ruin. This is illustrated by the Example of the * *Lacedemonians*, who, because they had

* Isocrates in Evagoras.

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conquer'd *Greece*, must needs try to make themselves Masters of *Asia*, and were overcome by the *Persians*. And the Negligence of the * Emperors, in omitting to make the *Romans* lay down their Arms, was one of the chief Causes of the Fall of the Empire. The *Carthaginians* too were utterly ruin'd by the *Romans*, for venturing to carry the War into the Bowels of *Italy*.

IT happens frequently, that Governments only in *tolerable Circumstances* conspire against those that are more *powerful*; whence they incur their Anger, and hardly any Measures are observ'd between them : Whence also it is manifest, that when Efforts are redoubled, and the weaker State is unable to maintain the War, the first Shock does its Business, and makes it submit to a pernicious Neutrality; in which Case, whether they win or lose, they must fall a Prey to the Victor, without either Dignity or Reputation.

* Vegetius, lib. iii. l. lxxviii.

A WEAK State is soon lost in the smallest Storm, or falls to the Share of the stronger; or if it should save itself under another's Protection, it frequently exchanges the Appearance of Liberty for real Servitude. If it begins the War, 'tis easily ruin'd, because it is not yet confirm'd in Strength; as may be seen by the * *Equi*, the *Vejentes*, and the *Volscians*, all easily conquer'd by the *Romans*. If it increases in Power, it must expect many Conspiracies from the Envy and Suspicion of neighbouring States, as appears plainly by the || *Roman Commonwealth*, which upon the like Occasion drew on itself the *Social War*. If it has arriv'd to the Maturity of Greatness, it is hardly to be govern'd, without keeping a watchful Eye on the Confines; and even then it sometimes falls from its Grandeur by its own Weight, and the very † Branches by which it aspir'd to

* Dion. Halicarn. lib. 9.

|| Liv. Decad. I. lib. 4.

† Q. Curt. lib. 7.

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the Zenith of Power. For this Reason *Augustus*, among other Things, left for the Instruction of his Successors, * *To guard the Limits of the Empire carefully*. If a State declines, all things concur to hurry it on to the Precipice; where it soon arrives, and sooner reaches the Bottom.

IF it has enjoy'd a long Interval of Peace, 'tis render'd incapable of defending itself in War, as may be gather'd from the Case of the † *Equi*, when attack'd by the *Romans* under their Consul *Luc. Sempronius*. Sometimes they are frighted at the least Commotion, as it happen'd to the *Romans* during *Catiline's* Conspiracy, and grow subject to Revolutions from internal Causes through Sloth and Idleness, and the numerous Vices that attend them. When it is involv'd in War, 'tis expos'd to the various Accidents and Risques of it. When 'tis wholly intent upon Conquest, and lies under

* Tacit. lib. 1.

† Liv. Decad. I. lib. 9.

the Necessity of employing a numerous and warlike People; if Opportunities of carrying on Wars fail, Discord and Sedition are apt to start up within. Thus, *Rome*, by reason of its ever striving for new Acquisitions, suffer'd a long Course of Civil Wars after the Destruction of *Carthage* her Rival. When a State is only inclin'd to Peace, without any regard to Military Discipline, it becomes the Scope of other Mens Ambition; for if its Subjects are possess'd of Vassallages, or are otherwise powerful, 'tis subject to internal Revolutions, as well as to those that may be brought about by Foreigners, tempted to it by domestick Discord: If it has no such Subjects, 'tis easily attack'd; and when once conquer'd by *Foreigners*, there's no Hopes of its ever recovering, because the Nobles and the Powerful are the Support and the vital Spirit of all States.

WHEN the Government is * *Monarchical*, it falls to Ruin by the *Disagree-*

* Aristot. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

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ment of those who have the Administration in their Hands, as well as by *Contempt*; and is often brought to Destruction by the innate Lust of *Arbitrary Power*, which not being able to keep its Legs long by reason of the Violence necessary to support it, it must undergo some Change by the Conspiracies and Resentment of the Subjects; not those of the mean and dastardly Kind, but those who exceed in Generosity, Greatness of Soul, Riches, and Nobility; who, in Conjunction with the Commonalty, can no longer bear with the Wickedness and Violence of the *Tyrant*. This moves them to Insurrections, either by the Instigation of *leading Men*, or the Suggestions of *Despair*.

WHEN the Government is * *Aristocratical*, Revolutions either take their Rise from *Many* concern'd, who reckon themselves no ways inferior to the *Few* that govern, and refuse to bear the Yoke; or they spring from *Men of*

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 7.

Figure, of equal Capacity, tho' despis'd by the *Governing Party*; or from some *one Person* of Courage and Magnanimity, who is not suffer'd to share his Country's Honours; or from a *Party fall'n into extreme Poverty*, tempted by the Wealth and Abundance of their Fellows; or from some great and *powerful Personage*, who has taken it into his Head to usurp the Supreme Power; or they may be brought about by the * *Multitude alone*, presuming themselves equal to the *Few*, tho' they do not enjoy Honours as they do; or if † they have been inur'd to War, and are become ‡ powerful, they are soon mov'd to discharge themselves from the Power of the *Few*, and to divest them of all Authority, provok'd by their continual *Injuries and Affronts*.

If *Ambition* or *Avarice* makes the *Governing Party* differ in their Views, the State suffers proportionably, as it

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 3.

† Idem cap. 7.

‡ Polyb. Hist. lib. 6.

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falls a Prey to the *Tyranny* of any One that can set himself at the Head of the injur'd and despis'd *Multitude*, especially if he be of the *Nobility*. When there are but *Few* concern'd in the *Administration*, it is liable to be overturn'd by the *Rich*, who are either unemploy'd, or debarr'd from profitable Posts in the Government. It is equally obnoxious to the factious Designs of those who strive to gain the *Favour* of the *People*. It is likewise expos'd to the Machinations of the *Nobles* that govern, if they have squander'd away their own *Fortunes*; and it may be ruin'd by the Contrivances of those that command the *Mercenaries*, where the *Few* have no Confidence in the *Multitude*, either in Peace or War.

IF the Government is * *Democrati- cal*, 'tis subject to the *Contempt* of the *Nobility*, who, on account of their Birth, disdain to be levell'd with others: 'Tis likewise endanger'd by the Power of the *Rich*, whose Ability naturally

* *Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 3.*

prompts them to affect *Sovereignty*: And it becomes the Aim of any *One* that is in great Authority with the *People*, who, if he happens to be chosen *General* by them, and falls in with popular *Arrogance*, he must necessarily pave the Way to the *Tyranny* of some *one* or other of his Fellow-Citizens; but if * *he* himself is chosen by the *People* to protect and defend them from the *Insults* of the *Rich*, when he is us'd to command and to be obey'd, he glides by degrees from the Character of a *Protector* into that of a *Tyrant*. The same Changes may be brought about by the *Obstinacy* and *Malignity* of *popular* Leaders, who, either by calumniating or menacing one or other of the *Nobles*, force them thro' Fear to conspire against the *People*, or by provoking the *whole Body*, tempt them to alter the Form of Government.

A REVOLUTION attempted from *without*, succeeds oftner than that which has its Source from *within*; for

* Plato Dial. 8. of *Laws*.

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the Subjects, who do not always desire it, are brought with Difficulty to join in it, and are very rarely able to accomplish it, because many Circumstances must concur to the good Success. But *Princes* (who are ever acted by the Springs of Surmise and Ambition, and wish for the Servitude and Ruin of others) are eager of laying hold on Occasion (which frequently offers of itself) and then the much desir'd End is accomplish'd.

THE more powerful *States* are less subject to Change than others, because no *Subject* dares go about it, and *Foreigners* can hardly compass it, as it stands secure in its own Strength. Weaker *States* stand in need of Alliances, which frequently prove short and inconstant; and are easily ruin'd by the Insolence and Ambition of Subjects. Every Commotion is fatal to *States* of the *weakest* Rank; and yet it happens sometimes, that the *Stronger* perish sooner by presuming too far on their Strength, as well as by Pride and Neglect. On the contrary, *States* of the

the *middle* and *lowest* Class make a brave Stand sometimes; the *One*, by sheltering itself under the Protection of a *greater*, moderate, and just *Power*: and the *Other*, either by joining with other *Princes* to form the Balance, or by living discreetly within its own Limits, and by watching carefully, and with due Concern, over their own Preservation.

A * *Monarchy* is least of all subject to *Revolutions*, because subject to the fewer Contrarieties; for the Disproportion between the *Prince* and the *Subject* is very great. This *Form* discourages none of its *Constituents*, and is the perfectest in being: But it is likewise true, that *Revolutions* are effected now and then by a *Foreign Power* in this *Form* of Government sooner than in others, by the natural Tendency which it has to alter and innovate, beyond what is observable in other *Forms*.

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

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THERE are several Sorts of † *Monarchies*: Sometimes the Sovereignty is granted by the *People* to one Person and his *Successors*, with Authority over certain determinate Things; or over every Thing, but under the Direction of the *Law*: or for *Term of Life*, or for a certain *Time*, or depending such and such an *Enterprize*, or to be perpetual *General*, or with absolute *Authority* over every Thing.

AND several Sorts of *internal* Changes; for of those only we pretend to treat, may be consider'd in the fore-mention'd different *Species* of *Monarchy*; some of which are *Proper* and *Perfect*, and happen when a *Monarchy* changes either into an *Aristocracy* or a *Democracy*: or they may be *Improper* and *Imperfect*, and happen when the Government *continues*, but either changes in relation to the *End* (when the sole Advantage of the *Governor* is propos'd) or of an *Hereditary* one be-

† Arist. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10 & 11.

comes *Elective*, or of an *Elective* one becomes *Hereditary*, or is divided among a Number of *Successors*, or changes one Prince for another.

WE shall chiefly treat of the two last Sorts, because they are of the greatest Consequence. *Revolutions* are attempted for different *Ends*, are born of various *Causes*, terminate in different kinds of *Government*, require particular *Qualities* in those that accomplish them, are obtain'd by various *Means*, must be attended with some *Opportunities*, happen sooner to one State than another for different *Reasons*, must be introduc'd by immediate *Dispositions*, and Effects of the greatest Consequence will ensue.



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CHAP. II.

Why Subjects attempt Revolutions in MONARCHIES.



THE Subjects of a * *Monarchical* Government may rise either against the Person of the *Prince*, or against his *Government*: When they aim at his *Person*, 'tis either on account of his *Qualities* or his *Actions*.

DIFFERENCE of † *Religion* in a *Prince* is one of the *Qualities* the most effectual in this Case; especially if the Subjects have embrac'd a false *Religion*, such as is an Enemy to *Kingly* Government, because, being perswaded that they are freed from the Tyes of *Obedience* and *Fidelity*, and destitute both of the Knowledge of the *Truth*

* *Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.*

† *Procop. lib. 3.*

and

and divine *Worship*, 'tis almost impossible that they should not attempt a *Revolution*. Hence, in whatsoever State it be that *Religion* undergoes a Change, the *State* can never remain quiet or free from Change, and as soon as *Secretaries* begin to spring up, *Order* and *Tranquillity* will infallibly disappear; because *Religion* is the only Basis of all *Governments*, by preserving Allegiance to *Princes*, Love for one's *Country* and *Neighbour*, and doing *Justice* to all. This Assertion will appear still more plainly, if the *major* part of the Subjects have embrac'd the *Heresy*, and their *Leaders* and *Abettors* are Men of Power and Character; or only make an Handle of the *Heresy* to be reveng'd of their natural *Prince*, to maintain themselves in *Post* and *Authority*, and keep what they have already seized: or if they design to *usurp* the *Throne*, or change the *Form* of Government, or have any *Pretensions* to the *Crown*; especially when the *Prince* is engag'd in other Wars of great Consequence; and his *Rivals* in *Glory*, or they that are *jealous* of his
Power,

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Power, and they that border on his *Dominions*, assist the *Ring-leaders* of that false Religion.

ANOTHER *Quality* is, the Prince's being of a foreign *Country*; because *Foreigners* are less acceptable to the *People*, who are with Difficulty brought to obey him: as it happen'd to the Children of * *Ariobarzanes* the *Mede*, who were all driven out of *Armenia*.

THERE is likewise great Hazard when the Succession of a *Kingdom* comes to move from one *Line* to another; at least great *Alterations* and *Commutations* may be apprehended, especially if the *Successor* is descended of a Rival Nation, or of one that has been an *Enemy* to his Subjects; or if the new *Prince's* † *Ministers* prove *avaricious* and *haughty*; or if there be any one in the *Nation* that has something of an *apparent Right* to the *Throne*; or if the *Nobility* dislike the *Prince* that succeeds.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

† Guicciar. lib. 13.

W H E N

WHEN the *Prince* and *People* differ in their Manners, the *People* are apt to take great Disgust, and imitate him with Reluctance. It was for this Reason that * *Vonones* was driven out of *Parthia*. And if the *Prince* is an *Usurper*, his bad *Title* changes the Minds of his Subjects, and withdraws them from their Obedience; and the rather, if their *Natural King*, either dead or only forc'd to fly, was generally belov'd; or if his *Heir* was a Prince of great Hopes.

THE *Actions* of a *Prince* most likely to produce Changes in the State, are, his acting entirely for his *private Interest* in Opposition to his *Subjects*, without regarding the *true End* of Government; his *injuring* them in Estate, Life, or Honour; his destroying ancient *Institutions* and *Rules*; and his leading a remarkably mean, abject, incontinent *Life*. This is plain from the Example of † *Nero*, whose Ty-

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

† Sueton. in *Nero's* Life.

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rannical Government made the *Romans* rebel, and afterwards depose him.

IT seldom happens that an *Hereditary Kingdom* suffers a Revolution, if a good *Prince* does not degenerate into a very bad one, and blindly regardless of the true End of *Government*, break out into unsufferable * *Excesses*. † It is naturally the most *lasting* Species of Government, because the *best*; but when it begins to be infected with *Tyranny*, 'tis the shortest liv'd of all other *Forms*, because it sinks into the *worst*.

SUBJECTS are highly uneasy under *Kingly Government* in the afore-said Cases; but tho' they aim at the Lives of *Princes* endow'd with such *Qualities* and *Actions*, 'tis not their Desire to change the *Form*, but only their *Master*; and therefore while they intend immediately the Death of the *Prince*, tho' they obtain their *End*, a

* Arift. Pol. lib. 4. cap. 2.

† Plat. Dial. 8. de Repub.

Change of the Form of Government does not generally ensue, because it descends to his Sons, or to other *Lawful Successors*, except the *Sons* or *Successors* are likewise generally hated.

WE commonly find, that Religion, a foreign Extraction, different Manners, and the Want of a good Title, sooner produce *Rebellions* than *Conspiracies*, as they affect the whole *Body* of the Subjects; but *unjust* and *violent Actions* in a Prince are more apt to produce *Conspiracies* than *Rebellions*, because the *Rich* and the *Nobility*, who are but a small Number, are more ready to resent and revenge Injuries; and consequently the mention'd *Qualities* are more likely to deprive the Prince's *Sons* and *Successors* of the Crown, and to change it into another Form, than the *Actions*; but then these last mention'd are more likely to prove fatal to the *Prince*; so that *Rebellions* prove most hurtful to the *State*, and *Conspiracies* most dangerous to the *Prince*.

Change

BUT

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BUT because it does not always follow from the Death of the *Prince*, that his *Sons* or *Lawful Successors* are depriv'd, and that the Government changes its *Form*, to know what Effects the Death of the *Prince* may produce, we must consider his Condition, the *End* propos'd by the *Assassins*, the *Persons* concern'd, the *Disposition* of the Subjects, and the *Strength* of those that have a *Title* to the Succession; because if the dead *Prince* had but lately seiz'd on the *Government*, tho' the *Assassins* had no other View but his Death, yet because the Memory of the *Liberty* they so lately enjoy'd is fresh in their Minds, and they are not inur'd to *Servitude*, the *Government* may be easily chang'd into another Form. Or, if he that was *assassinated*, had come in by *deposing* another; and the *Person* depos'd, or his *Successors*, are belov'd by the *People*, and ready to re-possess themselves of the *Government*, and the *Successors* of the *Usurper* are weak and negligent.

+

IF

IF the chief Design of the *Assassina-*
tors is the Death of the *Prince*, the
 State seldom changes its *Form*, or sub-
 mits to one that it does not belong to;
 because the *Assassina-*
tors are satisfy'd
 with having obtain'd their *End*, and
 proceed no farther, as is plain from
 the Cases of those *Princes* who have
 been murder'd out of *Revenge*, Zeal
 for *Religion*, or *Glory*, or *Fear*, or any
 like Cause, except in the Case of go-
 verning *Tyrannically*, when their *Suc-*
cessors are universally hated, or hap-
 pen to be at a considerable Distance;
 or when a Man of Power lays hold of
 the *Opportunity*; or if the *People* form
 a general *Insurrection*; or when the
State is already possess'd with Notions
 destructive of *Regal Government*.

WHEN the ultimate End of the
Assassins is *Usurpation*, or Change of
 Government, and either *One*, or a small
Number of Conspirators, put their De-
 sign in Execution with the Consent of
 the *People*, they certainly compass a
Revolution. So *Brutus* succeeded, when
 he

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he had expell'd *Tarquin*, because the *People* consented, and assisted him.

IF the Assassination of the *Prince* is accomplish'd without the Consent of the *People*; a Revolution can never succeed. The younger * *Brutus* try'd it by the Murder of *Cæsar*; but *Rome* could never recover her *Liberty*, because the *People* were displeas'd at the Murder. But if there be any one among the Assassins who has *Pretensions* to the Kingdom, he may easily make himself Master of it, as † *Tarquinius Superbus* did at *Rome* after the Murder of *Servius Tullius*.

IF *Few* concur in it, then the *Disposition* of the Subjects is to be consider'd, because if 'tis such as inclines them to receive another *Form*, a Revolution follows of Consequence; especially when the Forces by which the deceased *Prince* us'd to govern are not great enough to support the Claim of

* Sueton. in *Cæsar*.

† Liv. lib. 1.

the Successors, and they who have attempted the *Change*, are ready to prevent the Designs of any one who may aspire at the *Supreme* Power; as the Murderers of *Hieronimus*, Tyrant of * *Syracuse*, did, who march'd instantly to the City to prevent the Designs of *Andronodorus* his Uncle, if he had intended to seize on the Government. But if the *Subjects* are not dispos'd to receive another Form of Government, altho' the Death of the *Prince* shou'd happen, the State nevertheless will neither undergo any Change, nor will the Successors be depriv'd of it. † *Caligula* dy'd by a Conspiracy, and the *Senate* was willing to have chang'd the Government; but because the *Romans* were not dispos'd to relish *Liberty*, his Uncle *Claudius* was call'd to the Empire.

SUBJECTS endeavour at a Change of Government, either through *Ambition*, or *Desperation*, or out of a De-

* Liv. Decad. III. lib. 4.

† Sueton. in Claud.

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fire to enjoy *Liberty*. The *Ambitious* attempt Change either out of a Disgust taken to a private Life, or a Lust of Empire; and tho' they aim at the Life of the *Prince* to enjoy the Supreme Power, their View is immediately on the *Government*, and not against the *Prince*: Therefore, whether the Prince reign uprightly or unjustly, if he have able *Subjects*, tainted with this Lust of Sway, he lies expos'd to the Danger.

THE ambitious *Friends* of a * *Tyrant* are they that most easily conspire against him, because their *Familiarity* gives them an Opportunity of discovering his Imperfections thorowly, and therefore have a better Handle to annoy him, beside their knowing perfectly well, that *Tyrants are generally hated*.

IT generally happens, let the *Prince* be what he will, that the *Ambitious* who are un-employ'd, or whose *Posts* entitle them to a large Share of Authority, attempt either a Revolution,

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

or to usurp the Supreme Power, by the Importance of their Preferments; because they who are not employ'd, are incited by Indignation to believe they deserve the Authority which they have either been depriv'd of, or has been refus'd them; as may be seen in the Case of the * Duke of *Bourbon* and *Francis*, King of *France*. And now and then they take an Aversion to the very Authority they enjoy, while they observe unequal Persons join'd with them, or that their Equals pretend to outstrip them: This is evident from the Conduct of † *Cæcina*, who conspir'd against *Vitellius*, because he imagin'd that *Valens*, his Rival in *Power* and the *Emperor's* Favour, wou'd have got the better of him in both. They likewise that are possess'd of *Places* of great Consequence, allur'd by a Thirst after *Power* once enjoy'd, attempt to establish themselves in it by *Usurpation* and the Murder of the *Prince*, especially if they can muster

* Guicciard. Hist. lib. 15.

† Tacit. Hist. lib. 2.

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up a Force equal to the Execution of the Design; as * *Sejanus* thought to do in *Tiberius's* Time, † *Pescennius* in that of *Commodus*, and ‡ *Plautianus* in the Reign of the Emperor *Severus*. This seldom fails, if the *Prince* has been but lately put in Possession of the Throne, and gives himself up to be govern'd by others, as it happen'd to || *Tiridates*, King of the *Parthians*, who was deserted by all the great Men for trusting too much to *Abdageses*; or if he is wholly given up to Effeminate Pleasures, like ** *Sardanapalus*, who was depriv'd of the Empire by *Arbaces*, General of the *Medes*, for debasing himself so far as to keep company with none but *Women*; or when he wants *Sons* to succeed him, which was the Case of †† *Alexander the Great*, who was despis'd for it, and had many Plots form'd against him

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

† Herod. and Lamp. in the Life of *Commod.*

‡ Herod. in *Sever.*

|| Tacit. Annal. lib. 6.

** Justin. Hist. lib. 1.

†† Q. Curt. lib. 6.

by his principal Officers; or if he has incurr'd the *Hatred* of his Subjects in general, or has a large, corrupted, insolent, standing *Army*, which made * *Otho* conspire against *Galba*, and rob him both of his Empire and Life; or when the Ambition of *Subjects* is fed and supported not only by great Employments in *Possession*, but by great *Riches* and *Fortresses* belonging to themselves; or animated by the Prospect of obtaining Assistance easily, and a certain *Union* among themselves, because all these Circumstances either beget *Contempt*, or encourage the *Ambitious* to persevere in Wrong, or promise an happy *Event*.

To know how well an *Usurper* is establish'd, 'twill chiefly be needful, among other Things, to consider the following, *viz.* Whether the *Prince* was murder'd or expell'd by *Conspiracy* or general *Insurrection*; Whether the expell'd Prince is *dead* or *alive*, and has either *Son* or *Relation*

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

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in being; Whether they live within the *Kingdom*, or in some neighbouring *State*; Whether they give Hopes of governing well, or if the deceas'd Prince was generally *below'd*; Whether they that have been encourag'd and preferr'd during his *Reign* are still in *Place*; Whether the *Malcontents* are more powerful than their *Enemies*, and if they continue entirely satisfy'd with the *Usurper*; Whether the Inclination of the *Subjects* continues hearty for the dead or expell'd *Prince*, or his *Children* and *Succeffors*; Whether the *Subjects* are naturally inconstant; Whether they are accustom'd to frequent *Changes*; Or, if they have learnt, that tho' they have chang'd *Masters*, they have submitted to more intolerable *Servitude*.

WHEN Subjects are render'd *desperate* by ill Treatment, and being loaded with insupportable *Grievances* for a considerable Time, they not only desire to destroy the *Cause* of them, and to be soundly reveng'd for the *Wrongs* they have suffer'd, but arrive to such
a Pitch

a Pitch of Abhorrence of *Monarchical* Government, that they can neither bear, or so much as endure to hear the Name of a *King* mention'd; whence they not only rise against the Person of the *Prince*, but the very *Form* of Government, and resolve rather to die, than continue subject to any *one* Person.

DESPAIR is not quickly generated, because the Minds of Subjects are neither immediately exasperated, nor on every slight Account; and therefore, neither is the *Change* so sudden, which proceeds from it. Before it operates, the *Sufferings* must be excessive; the *Hatred* universal; Subjects must be ripe for *Revolution*, not only desire, but attempt it, and chuse their *Leaders*; there must have been likewise a *Series* of bad Princes; the Inclinations of the *reigning Prince* must be known to be obstinately and wickedly bent, his *Title* to the Crown bad, and that the Wrongs done by him be of that Nature, to affect every *Subject*, whether *Noble* or *Plebeian*: be-
C 4. cause

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cause these *Causes* either increase *Despair*, or seemingly excuse *Revenge*, or spur on desperate *Subjects*, or unite them through *Fear*.

WHAT has been said may be illustrated from *Livy*. The continu'd ill Treatment and great Oppression which the * *Romans* suffer'd under the *Kings* (which shew'd them to be bad *Princes*, and that the *Hardships* which the *People* groan'd under were excessive) were the Cause of their abhorring the very Name of a *King*, and swearing to extirpate *Kingly Government*; this shew'd their *Hatred* to be universal. *Tarquin* shew'd an Inclination to govern wickedly, and was an *Usurper*; here again the Perseverance in *Ill* is manifested, and the bad *Title*. Then there was a *Brutus* in the Case; he was the Man of *Power* and *Authority*, who set himself up for the *People's* Leader. Then there was the *Rape* and *Adultery* committed by *Tarquin's* Son (here's the *Crime*) which might

* *Liv. lib. i.*

have happen'd to any Man's Wife. For these Reasons the Expulsion of *Tarquin* follow'd, as well as the Change of the Government. From *Tiberius's* to *Nero's* Time the Romans were greatly aggriev'd, oppress'd, and butcher'd, which might have excited them to such a Pitch of *Despair*, as might have made them extirpate Kingly or Imperial Government; but because some of the fore-mention'd Conditions were wanting, which was, that the powerful Part was not willing to change their Situation (who were the Army, us'd to Rapine, Donatives, and Insolence; for which the Imperial Government was best fitted and adapted) for that Reason the Effect did not follow; and the rather, because the Nobles were infected with the like Vices and Insolence, and had no Liking for a *Republican* Government, so that almost all were dispos'd for *Servitude*. Therefore, when the Nobility is vicious and corrupt, let the State be never so free, it will rather return to *Monarchy*, tho' *Tyrannical*, to enjoy its own vicious Inclinations, as may be

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seen in the Case of * *Brutus's* Sons and their Adherents, after the Expulsion of *Tarquin*.

SUBJECTS rise with great Vehemence against the *Usurper*, who has depriv'd them of their *Liberty*, and not only endeavour his Destruction, but also to deface the very Appearance of *Kingly* Government; except they be already tir'd out with *Civil* Wars, and the Hatred between the *Nobles* and *Plebeians* be grown exceeding great; or if the *Usurper* has found Means to render himself belov'd by the *powerful* Part; or if all are dead that enjoy'd *Posts* and *Preferments* under the *Republick*, or if the *Citizens* of the greatest Courage have had the Misfortune to *die* in the Field, or to be *banish'd*; and the † *Nobility* inclin'd to *Servitude* by affecting Riches and Honours; all which *Reasons* contributed to make the *Romans* sit down quietly under the Reign of *Augustus*.

* Plut. in *Publicola*.

† Dion. Hist. lib. 56.

Nor is this Passion ever extinguish'd in the Breasts of *Citizens*, till the Foot-steps of all *Liberty* are entirely defac'd, no Memory of the past Government remains, and their free and generous *Minds* are thorowly chang'd under long *Servitude*; and *Ambition*, *Avarice*, together with a *Disposition of Minds* opposite to that of a Political Life and *Civil* Institution, are actually introduc'd.

HENCE it is that People are apt to place a Confidence in, and obey and cordially follow whosoever sets up for their Leader, with a Design to recover their ancient *Liberties*; which appears to have been the Case of the ancient † *Gauls* in *Tiberius's* Time, when they were sollicitated to rise against the *Romans* by *Florus* and *Sacrovir*. And if in this Case the *Usurper* is not much superior in Force to them whose *Liberties* he has seiz'd on; or if he is not very artful, brave, prudent, and particularly careful in keeping a good

† Tacit. Annal. lib. 3.

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Guard, it will be hard for him to avoid *Death*, or a Change of *Government*; or if he is not adroit in removing or securing the Persons of those who are Enemies to his *Usurpation*. This will happen so much the sooner, if at the Time of the *Usurpation* the *Laws* or *Political Institutions* stood on their proper *Basis*; if there was proportionably more *Good* than *Corruption* in the Republick, and the Government equally *useful* to all the Subjects. This appears evidently in the Case of *Julius Cæsar*, who, after he had made himself Master of the * *Roman Liberties*, was murder'd for want of having a watchful Eye to his own Security, and not keeping that Guard which he should have had about his Person: or his Error in not knowing the Men he had to do with; for he ought to have known that *Brutus* and *Cassius*, and their Friends, were Enemies to his *new erected* Government, and impatient of *Monarchy*: and for having committed another Oversight in regard to his Secu-

* Plutarch, in Cæsar.

rity, in not removing them to a greater Distance; or satisfying them, or putting it out of their Power to annoy and hurt him.

THERE are three Things that principally contribute to the Recovery of lost *Liberty*; when the Government is popular and generally desires *Liberty*; when the general Bent is opposite to *Monarchy*; and the *Usurper* gives Indications of a *cruel* and *corrupt Administration*; because these Reasons either render *Servitude* intolerable, or hinder the *Establishment* of the Government, or hasten a *Revolution* thro' Fear.

'TIS certain, that in a Government formerly *Aristocratical*, the *People* are not so sensible of the Hardships of *Monarchy*, because they liv'd in a kind of *Servitude*, and inflexibly hate the Nobility; and it would be easier for the *Usurper* to get rid of an *Aristocracy* by giving them some sort of Satisfaction, or removing them, or securing himself any other way.

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To know how long an *Usurper's* Reign may continue, 'twill be needful to consider, what *Form* of Government subsisted before the *Usurpation* took place; in what Condition the Affairs of the *Republick* were; how far it had deviated from the *Principles* on which it was first founded; how the *Commonalty* and *Nobility* agreed; how the *Plebeians* were treated; what sort of *Subjects* the *Nobility* made, and what *Factions* they labour'd under; which way both of them came to be tainted with *Luxury*, *Avarice*, and *Ambition*; which way the *Usurper* attain'd the Throne; whether by the Assistance of the *People* only, or the *Nobility*, or by both together, or by the Help of *Foreigners*; what Proportion the *Commons* and *Nobles* bear to one another in Strength and Number; whether the *Usurper* is a *Native* or a *Foreigner*; if he is assisted by any other Prince; if he has most Friends or Adversaries; if he is in Favour with the *powerfullest* Party; if the *State* is engag'd in foreign Wars, and if *Servitude* begins to become agreeable to it.

CHAP.



CH A P. III.

*Concerning the other Causes of the
Revolutions of Kingdoms.*



THE most considerable Causes of *Change* are, * *Wrongs*, *Fear*, *Hatred*, and *Contempt*. The Sons of † *Pisistratus* were destroy'd for *Wrongs* done ; and ‡ *Bru-tus* and *Collatinus* rose against *Tarquin*. || *Artabanus* rebell'd against *Xerxes* for *Fear*; and ** *Galba's* Army against himself. *Hatred* made the †† *Romans* expel *Tarquin*, and deprive ‡‡ *Nero* both of *Life* and *Empire*. Lastly, *Contempt* instigated *Dion* to attack *Dionysius*, and || || *Arbaces* to rebel

* *Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.*

† *Thucid. lib. 6.*

‡ *Liv. Dec. I. lib. 1.*

|| *Arist. ibid.*

** *Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.*

†† *Liv. ibid.*

‡‡ *Suet. in the Life of Nero.*

|| || *Justin. lib. 1.*

against

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againſt *Sardanapalus*. One only of theſe *Causes* is ſufficient to create a Change, but more concur frequently to the ſame Effect. This is manifeſt from the Expulſion of *Tarquin*, that the *Injury* done to * *Collatinus* mov'd him and *Brutus*, as *Hatred* did the *Roman* People: and † *Otho's* Seizure of the Empire proceeded from his *Contempt* of *Galba*, tho' the Army's Motive was *Fear*.

WRONG is the moſt violent Cauſe, becauſe it produces *Diſdain* and *Anger*, which are attended with *Rage*. *Fear* is more powerful, becauſe it repreſents to the Mind a *Necceſſity* of Acting or Suffering. *Hatred* is a Paſſion more fix'd and laſting, becauſe it ſtrikes deep Root in the Breſt. *Contempt* is more confident, becauſe it diſpoſes to a Belief of the Eaſineſs of accompliſhing one's Deſign againſt the Prince. *Injury* and *Fear* propoſe the Death of the Prince frequently for their End;

* Liv. Dec. I. lib. 1.

† Tacit. Hiſt. lib. 1.

Hatred a Change into another Form of *Government*; and *Contempt* the Usurpation of the Supreme Power.

HATRED is a * *Cause* that may unite the whole Subjects; *Contempt* only few, because it only influences the Powerful and the Ambitious; but *Wrongs* and *Fear* may operate either of the two Ways. *Injury* for the most part incites the Noble and the Generous, because they value their Honour; *Fear* and *Hatred* move all sorts of People; and *Contempt* only the Great and the Powerful. *Hatred* accompanies every one of the other *Causes*: It accompanies *Injury*, because the injur'd † Party burns with *Anger* and *Disdain*, which imply a Degree of Hatred: 'Tis joyn'd with *Fear*, because the Person that *fears*, *hates* him that he is afraid of: And it likewise accompanies *Contempt*, because whosoever *despises*, likewise abhors the despis'd Prince, as unworthy of his *Fortune*, and incapable of his *Grandeur*.

* Arift. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

† Arift. ibid.

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CONTEMPT is more noxious than all the other *Causes*, and especially to *Tyrants*; because *Hatred* does not operate whilst it is curb'd by *Fear*, which ceases as soon as *Contempt* appears in the Case: hence (since the Tyrant is abhorr'd as he is an Usurper) while *Contempt* paves the Way to *Offence* and *Revenge*, which appear to the People to be *just* on account of his *unjust* Title, a *Change* must infallibly be the Consequence. And it is an evident Observation, that *Tyrannies* have with much ado preserv'd themselves during the Life of the first *Usurper*, but very few have been establish'd in their *Families*, because *Fear* dying with the Persons of the first *Usurpers*, which proceeded from being possess'd with a Notion of the *Tyrant's* Valour, the People have bravely shaken off the Yoke of *Servitude*. Their *Successors* too, proving often either *proud* and *unexperienc'd*, or *weak* and *effeminate*, and entirely resign'd to their *Lusts*, become hated and *contemptible*, and lay themselves open in many Instances

to their Enemies, as may be plainly seen by the Conduct of * *Hieronimus*, the Grand-child of *Hiero*, Tyrant of *Sicily*, and of *Dionysius* the younger, and many others.

CONTEMPT is fatal to a *lawful Prince*, who has ambitious, powerful, proud, and bold Subjects, fit to command Armies; because, imagining it easy to usurp the Throne in these *Circumstances*, they attempt it (as † *Cyrus* did against *Astyages*) as soon as he perceiv'd the Defection of his *Army*, and that he was drown'd in *Pleasures*. If the *Prince* has Subjects of great Capacity, in whom he reposes much *Confidence*, they are apt to innovate on account of the *Credit* they have, because they think that they can easily cloke their Designs, and seize on the *Throne*.

On the other side, *Hatred* is more dangerous than *Contempt* to the *Ty-*

* *Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.*

† *Arist. ibid.*

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rant whose Subjects are abject and effeminate; or even if they are Men of Courage, but unable to agree; because, as they are really unfit for it, they seldom attempt a *Change*, except thro' *Despair*, which makes even Cowardice brave, and is spirited up by *Hatred*. Besides, when Subjects have *Courage*, but disagree among themselves, while they stay *considering* about one another's Strength, they keep a *weak Prince* on his Legs; whereas, if they were to *unite*, they might destroy him. A general *Fear* begets this Union, which is the Effect of *Hatred*, not of *Contempt*; but because *Fear* and *Contempt* are the principal Causes of *Revolutions*, we talk of them only at present.



CHAP.



CHAP. IV.

Of Hatred in Subjects, and how a Prince may render himself Odious.



HATRED (which is an obstinate and offensive Malevolence of Subjects to a *Prince* and his *Government*) is an efficacious *Cause* of Change, because it destroys the *Love* which is one of the two chief Supports of Government, and breaks the Bond of Union between the *Prince* and *Subject*, which is the surest Basis of Government: it supplants *Respect*, and Inclination to *Obedience*; and in lieu of them, it introduces servile *Fear* and a Desire of *Revenge*, confirms the Mind in Wrongdoing, animates it to remove the present Evil, and obliges it to embrace the *Opportunity*.

THE *Love* of the Subjects is the real Wealth of Princes, and *Hatred*
robs

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robs them of this Good: The *People's* Benevolence is the great Bulwark of the State, and *Hatred* deprives them of this Security: A good Correspondence among the Subaltern Parts, is a wholesome Antidote against both *foreign* and *internal* Evils, and *Hatred* supplies Subjects with these *Poysons*. A Prince can have no better *Guard* for his Person, than the *Virtue* of his Friends and Servants, and the Affections of his Subjects, which are preferable to the best *arm'd Troops*. *Arms*, and numerous *Subjects* without *Affection*, are so far from proving a Safeguard to *Princes*, that they are so much more dangerous in Proportion to their *Numbers*, if they are not faithful. And for what other Reason were neither the *Prætorian* Bands, nor the numerous *Legions* of which the *standing Army* consisted, thought necessary to defend *Titus*, *Nerva*, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, *Antoninus* or *Marcus*; but because they enjoy'd the *Affections* of the *People*, and the Love of the *Senate*, which their good *Administration* had acquir'd for them? Or for what other *Cause*

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did both the Eastern and Western *Armies* prove insufficient Securities to *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Vitellius*, and so many other vile *Emperors*, but because they were universally *bated* for their *wicked* Government and infamous Lives? No *Prince* can long keep Master of a Kingdom that *bates* and abhors him, or of *Subjects* that he knows for certain to be secretly his Enemies; nor can he put any great Confidence in the slender Defence of *Fear* against that cruel *Pest*.

* **HATRED**, 'tis true, does not operate while it is united with *servile Fear*; but it is likewise true, that if it shakes Hands with *Fear*, and if *Contempt* shou'd by any means enter into the Confederacy, the Malevolence will quickly appear, and break out into *ouvert Acts*. *Hatred* is not apt to give Offence till it is pretty far gone; but if once it comes to be in Excess, it is *Rage* and *Despair*; and it † arrives easily at this Pitch,

* Cic. *Lentul.* lib. 1. *Epist.* 9.

† Senec. de *Clement.*

because

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because the Extremity of *Hatred* borders on the Extremities of *Rage* and *Despair*. * *Hatred* rises by slow Degrees; but the Distance is not great from *Murmuring* to *Reproach*, from thence to *Treachery*, and from *Treachery* to *Oppression*. Hatred not only moves the *Person* that is possess'd with it, but when its being *general* becomes no Secret, 'tis a strong Provocative to *Conspiracy* in the Subject, to *Insurrection* in the Ambitious, and a principal *Motive* to *foreign Powers*. 'Tis a potent Adversary to the *Quiet* and *Repose* of *Princes*, and lays them under an absolute Necessity of employing *Mercenaries*, *Spies*, and *Informers*: and what injur'd Subject is backward in revenging himself on a Prince become a Common Enemy? What *ambitious Person* would not take the first Opportunity, when he sees all Materials pre-dispos'd to his Purpose? What *Rival*, or foreign *Enemy* would not come to a Resolution, when he is appriz'd of the *Cheapness* of his Conquest? What

Senec. de Clement.

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Prince

Prince can live or sleep in Tranquillity, that knows himself to be universally hated? or employ his *own* Troops, if he believes them all to be his *Enemies*? or can forbear to encourage *Spies* and *Informers*, if he thinks his *Subjects* universally inclin'd to revolt?

THEREFORE, since Hatred is so hurtful to *Kingdoms*, and dangerous to *Princes*, we must contrive how to avoid it best; and to this End we must consider, that it is chiefly acquir'd four Ways, *viz.* by *Cruelty*, *Avarice*, *Lust*, and *Innovations*. *Cruelty* is opposite to *Clemency*, which adds a greater Lustre to a *Prince* than any other *Virtue*, and makes him be belov'd by his *Subjects*: *Cruelty* is *Inhumanity*, and in reality the *Property* of Brutes; and 'tis evident, that * *Gotarzes*, King of the *Parthians*, was so hated by them for his *Barbarity* to his own *Family*, that they rebell'd against him, as the † *Aegyptians* had done against their

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 11.

† Herod. lib. 2.

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King *Apries* for the same Reason. These Events will happen so much the rather, if a *Prince* begins his Reign with any remarkable Piece of *Cruelty*, as it was in the Case of * *Vitellius*, who was immensely *hated* for having order'd *Dolabella*, a Relation of *Galba's*, to be murder'd: or if at any time he puts any *Person* of great Distinction to Death without good Reason; so *Idibaldus*, King of the *Goths*, was hated for the Slaughter of *Uriā*: or if he does it on slender Pretences, he loses his Reputation, and becomes *hateful* to Mankind, tho' belov'd by his *People* before, and tho' they had a good Opinion of his *Administration*; as it happen'd to the Emperor *Claudius*, for having put *Appius Silanus* wantonly to Death.

A V A R I C E deprives Mankind of their † *Goods*, which are dearest next to Life; and it robs them of their || *Properties*, to subject them to a mul-

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 2.

† Dion. in Vesp.

|| Guicc. Hist. lib. 1.

itude of Hardships. For this Reason
**Vespasian* became hateful to the *Alex-*
andrians, *Ludovicus Sforza* to the *Mi-*
lanois, the *Roman Empire* in *Tiberius's*
 Time to the *Gauls*, and the *Cappado-*
cians rebell'd against their King *Ar-*
chelaus.

LUST tarnishes *Honour*, which the
 World values at so high a Rate: for we
 read, that † *Lucretia's* Rape provok'd
 the whole *Roman* People, and that
Hippias the Son of *Pisistratus* was so
 abhorr'd for this Crime, that he was
 expell'd *Athens*, as was afterwards
Childeric the Father of *Clodoveus* out
 of *France*.

INNOVATIONS destroy the *Form*
 of Government, that *Manner* of Life
 which the *Subjects* us'd to lead, and
 change the *Customs* and *Constitution*.
 We have an Instance of this in ‡ *Alex-*
ander the Great, who having thought

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 3. & 6.

† Just. lib. 1.

‡ Q. Curt. lib. 10.

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fit to lay aside the *Grecian Customs*, and conform himself to the *Persian*, became so despicable in the Opinion of the *Macedonians*, that they laid down their Arms and desir'd to be dismiss'd: and * *Scile*, for having embrac'd the *Greek Customs*, and despis'd his *Country's*, incurr'd the Hatred of the *Scythians* to that Degree, that they rebell'd against him, and chose *Ottomafdes* in his Room.

To prevent the abominable Opinion of † *thirsting after Blood and Cruelty*, let the *Judges* and *Courts* of Judicature execute *Justice*; and let all *Grace* proceed immediately from the *Prince*: But if he has had the Misfortune to shed great *Quantities* of *Blood*, it should appear by the Chastisement of his *Ministers*, that they were the *Advisers* and *Promoters* of it. In order to avoid the *Hatred*, which is the Consequence of great *Taxes*, let *Princes* do their utmost Endeavour to shew,

* Herod. lib. 4.

† Aristot. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 11.

that there was an absolute *Necessity* for imposing them. The Example of * *Scipio Africanus*, who won the Hearts of the *Carthaginians* for one Act of Continnence, demonstrates how much it behoves Princes to *endear* themselves to their Subjects, and carry themselves continently and *modestly*. He who would reform the *State*, must do it by Degrees, as *Augustus* did, if he would avoid incurring universal *Hatred*, and without altering the ancient *Names* of things, he may change the *Substance*. 'Tis observable, that even Tyrants have continu'd long in their *Usurpations*, when they have left the *Country* to be govern'd by its own *Laws*; as † *Orthagoras* and his Successors did among the *Sicyonians*. On the other hand, let *Princes* have never so many unknown Virtues, if they chance to contradict the Practice of *former ones*, or that *manner of Life* that the Subjects have been us'd to; these Virtues will produce *Hatred* and *Abhor-*

* Polyb. lib. 10.

† Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 12.

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rence, which appears in the Case of * *Vonones*, who, for no other Reason, was hated by the *Parthians*: And whosoever goes about to root out *Abuses* too hastily, will be apt to incur a great deal of *Hatred*, and expose himself to certain *Danger*. Thus the Emperor † *Pertinax* became so *odious*, that he was murder'd for endeavouring to rectify the *Abuses* introduc'd into the State by his Predecessor *Commodus*. If therefore a *lawful Prince* avoids splitting on one of those *four* dangerous Rocks, he can hardly be alarm'd with *internal* Commotions or Changes, much less with *Foreign* Troops, which seldom attempt to subvert a *Monarchy*, if the ill Disposition of the *Subjects* does not give either some *Near* or *Remote* Handle for it.

It is farther observable, that universal *Hatred* is not only the Effect of the foremention'd *Vices*, but of every *Action* that seems to have the Appear-

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

† Dion. in Pertin.

ance of them; because the Generality of Mankind are not us'd to examine the *Substances* of things, but content themselves with looking on their *Surfaces*, are always *jealous* of their Prince's Actions, and form false Judgments, while they are under the *Influence* of *Doubt*. But if the Prince is really infected with these *Vices*, the Prejudice operates (in regard to the Passion of *Hatred*) in Proportion to the prevailing Opinion of inflicting *Punishments* and *Censures*, and raising *Taxes* (tho' he has Right on his side) if not attended with the *necessary* Circumstances. Besides, the Vices and Faults of a Prince, *quatenus Prince*, render him more odious than the Vices or Faults which he commits in a *private Capacity*. *Cruelty*, *Avarice*, and *Innovating* may be colour'd handsomely over; but no Pretext can be dress'd up to excuse *Lust*; for which Reason, the *Odium* contracted on this Score, is never to be cancell'd by any good Office: But Malevolence, contracted either by levying *exorbitant Taxes*, by *Confiscations*, or for having put to *Death* or

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injur'd any *Subject*, may be entirely cancell'd by *Remission* of Taxes, *Recompence*, or by *encouraging* the Person offended, or his *Successors*. In fine, 'tis not possible to dissemble these *Vices* for any considerable Time, because 'tis not to be imagin'd that any one can longer wear the *Mask*.

To this we may add, that the same *Vices* produce the same Passion of *Hatred* in the Sufferers, not only when inherent in the Person of the *Prince*, but likewise when they are found in his *Sons*, *Ministers* or *Favourites*; because the Blame of every bad *Action* of theirs is imputed to the *Prince*, on Presumption that he is *infected* as well as they. There have been many evident Examples of this Matter, particularly in *Rome* with regard to * *Galba*, on the account of his *freed Men*; in *Italy*, with regard to † *Justinian*, on the account of *Alexander* sent to succeed *Bellisarius* in the Government;

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

† Procop. de bell. Goth. lib. 3.

and in *Bologna* against * *Giovanni Bentivoglio*, on account of his Sons. While he delays *punishing* these Vices, or *prohibiting* them, 'tis manifest that he permits them, and despises the *injur'd* Persons, who repay his *Contempt* by resolving on swift *Revenge*. This appears by *Pausanias*, who being assur'd of † *Philip's* Disregard, notwithstanding he had complain'd to him of the *Affront* receiv'd from *Attalus*, resolv'd to murder him while he talk'd with his Son-in-law and *Alexander the Great*.

BESIDES, it will not be amiss to observe here, that *Cruelty* is most apt to excite *Criminals* to *Sedition*; who hate the *Prince* for that Reason, and engage in it to prevent the *Punishment* of their *Crimes*.

AVARICE generally makes an Impression on the *Multitude*, on account of the *Taxes* which they are loaded

* Guic. lib. 7.

† Justin. lib. 9.

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with, and are unable to pay. *Lust* works up the Powerful to *Hatred* and *Revenge*, because they value their Honour highly, and *Princes* have great Opportunities of Conversation with the Ladies: but *Innovations* in Matters of *Favour*, ancient *Customs* and *Laws*, and *fundamental* Constitutions in Cities or Kingdoms, force the whole Body of the Subjects to *Hatred* and *Rebellion*.

LUST is still more hurtful than *Cruelty*; whence more *Princes* and *Tyrants* have been dethron'd for this Vice than any other, because *Lust* breeds *Contempt* as well as *Hatred*; for the Person that abandons himself to dishonourable Pleasures, is commonly reputed mean-spirited, and furnishes Opportunities for his own Destruction. There are many Instances of this in *Sardanapalus*, *Dionysius* the younger, *Hicronymus*, *Heliogabalus*, *Amyntas*, *Periander*, *Tarquin*, and others who have lost their Dominions, for chusing rather to become *Slaves* to their *Lust*, than follow *virtuous Inclinations*;

clinations; and the greater Proportion a Prince has of this *Vice*, so much nearer he approaches to *his Ruin*, and his Kingdom to *Change*.

OTHER Things render a Prince *odious*; such as his thirsting too much after *Glory* and the enlarging of his Dominions, by which Means his Subjects never enjoy any Rest or Quiet; which was the Case of * *Philip* the *Macedonian*. A Prince who harrasses his *People* with continual *Wars* and *Taxes*, is always *bated* and *suspected* by them, as † *Lewis* the Eleventh of *France* was. Superlative *Moroseness* and *Pride* render a Prince likewise *hateful* to Subjects of the least degree of Spirit; as they did ‡ *Tigranes* the *Armenian* to all the *Greeks* that liv'd under his Government. A *Shew of Contempt* for all Men, hearing them with *Haughtiness*, wilfully *affronting* People in Conversation, and making

* Demost. Phil. II.

† Phil. de Comin. lib. 9.

‡ Plut. in Lucull.

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Access difficult for those that have Business with him, produce universal *Hatred*; as it happen'd to * *Hieronymus* Tyrant of *Syracuse*.

THE same Thing happens, if the *Manners* and *Laws* of a *Prince* differ widely from those of the *People* he governs: for which Reason the † *Athenian* Ambassadors told the *Lacedaemonians*, that their Government could never be relish'd by the rest of *Greece*.

MINISTERS produce the same Effects with *Princes* by their ill Government, especially if they be guilty of *Pride* and *Avarice*, and are trusted with large *Powers* at a Distance from the Person of the *Prince*; as is evident from ‡ *Alexander's* being sent by the Emperor *Justinian* to govern *Italy* after the recalling of *Bellisarius*. And

* Liv. lib. 4.

† Thucid. lib. 1.

‡ Procop. ibid.

lastly,

lastly, 'tis remarkable, that when once a Prince is hated by the *Majority* of his Subjects, he soon becomes the *Aversion* of all, because in that case the *Minority* goes with the Stream. As soon as he has incurr'd the * *People's* Dislike, all that he does, be it well or ill done, turns to his Disadvantage, because his Subjects are prejudic'd against him.

'Tis with the greatest Difficulty imaginable, that a Person who has once incurr'd an universal *Odium*, ever regains the *Affections* of the *People*, because they bring themselves easily to dislike their *Governors*; and there are never wanting some to promote it, where the *Subject* is pre-dispos'd.

THE *Hatred* of Subjects does not always produce immediate *Change*, for there are several concurrent *Circumstances* necessary, viz. that it be *implacable*, that they *despair* to better

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

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their Condition, that some *critical Opportunity* offer, that some Subject of *Authority* and *Power*, and generally *belov'd*, undertake the Affair, who may set himself at the Head of the *Revolt* under Pretence of *publick Good*.



CHAP.



C H A P. V.

Of Contempt, and what renders a Prince Contemptible.



ONTEMPT, which is a mean and abject Opinion entertain'd of a Prince and his Administration, as well by his own Subjects as Foreigners, is another effectual *Cause* of the Destruction of Kingdoms, or of the creating any sort of *Change* in them, because it steels the *Hatred* of the Subjects, and strengthens their Hands by divesting them of *Fear*: it flatters the Ambition of the *Powerful*, by representing the Facility of the Enterprize, and encourages them to attempt great and uncommon Matters, by breaking thro' all the Tyes of *Reverence*: It takes away the due Proportion that ought to be maintain'd between the *Head* and *Subjects*, filling the State with Confusion and deadly Poyson: And lastly,
it

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it puts a Period to the Royal Authority, and the good Opinion that the People ought to have of their *Prince*, which are the Soul and Life of Government.

WHAT other * Motive can make so many Millions of Men obey one Person, and he sometimes old and infirm too, but the Authority and Respect he is vested with? What can produce † *Vigour* in the State, but *Harmony* among the Subjects, which proceeds from nothing but the *Esteem* they have for their Prince? Nothing can preserve a Kingdom in a flourishing State but Royal Dignity, which is to be supported chiefly by *Decency* and *Reputation*.

WHEN *Hatred* and *Contempt* make joyntly one effectual Cause, when *Ambition* has no Stop put to its Career, when the Proportion between the *King* and his *Subjects* disappears, and all *Authority* and *Respect* vanishes, that

* Senec. lib. 1. de Clem.

† Q. Curt. lib. 6.

Kingdom must necessarily be confounded, and run to Ruin. This leads us to examine particularly whether a *Prince* makes himself contemptible by Defect of the Endowments of Mind, Body, or Fortune. In regard to the Endowments of the *Mind*, there are three Vices most effectual in begetting *Contempt*, viz. *Effeminacy*, *Pusillanimity*, and *Imprudence*. *Effeminacy* with-holds a Prince from employing his Thoughts about Government and high Designs becoming a *King*, bends his Mind only to *Lasciviousness*, and exposes him to frequent Injuries; for which Reason it was, that * *Ptolemy Philopater*, King of *Egypt*, fell beneath the *Contempt* of his Subjects. *Pusillanimity* makes a Prince *mean* and cowardly, and furnishes his Subjects with *Confidence* to withstand and contradict him; so that he is expell'd if they are a Warlike *People*, and they proceed to a new Election, altho' he has an *Hereditary Right*: For this Reason the

* Polyb. lib. 5.

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* *Goths* depos'd *Theodotus* and chose *Vitiges*. Imprudence deprives a Prince of *Counsel* and Forefight, by rendering him incapable of discerning his *Opportunities*, or the *Dispositions* of his Subjects, and unfit to maintain the *Decorum* and Dignity of Majesty; of which the Emperor † *Claudius* was an Eminent Instance, who made himself contemptible to *Rome*. Hence it is not of so great Importance to a Prince to give Hopes of his being possess'd of other Virtues, as it is of his having *Prudence* sufficient to preserve *Respect* and *Esteem*.

EFFEMINACY again produces an ‡ *Administration* so weak and feeble, that *Criminals* act with Impunity, whence Subjects do bare-facedly what they list, and claim more than belongs to them; and no Prince can ever be valu'd that holds the Sword of *Justice* in vain. From *Pusillanimity* springs

* Procop. lib. 1.

† Sueton. in Claud.

‡ Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 11.

Irresolution, overturning in a Minute what was determin'd just before, and the being pleas'd and displeas'd all in one Breath; whence one neither values such a Man's *Affection*, nor fears his *Anger*; so that a *Prince* with this inconstant Temper can neither make a *Friend*, nor terrify an *Enemy*. Moreover, the excessive Power and Authority of Subjects arise from *Imprudence*, whence the *Prince* disposes of nothing, and is divested of all but the *Name*; for in Reality the *Dignity* and *Majesty* of the *Prince* is eclips'd in Proportion to the Growth of the *Authority* and *Power* of any Subject.

IN regard to the Endowments of *Body*; Age, and a meagre or ill-favour'd Countenance, cause *Contempt*: Many believ'd that * *Tiberius* resolv'd to live out of *Rome* for this Reason, and that it was for this that the † *Athenians* had such a Contempt for *Antipater*, King of *Macedonia*: But these

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

† Plut. in Phocion.

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Defects are much less hurtful than either those of *Mind* or *Fortune*.

As for the Goods of *Fortune*; Want of Children or *Successors* is the greatest Defect of all; for many Children and *Successors* are a Defence to a Kingdom, exceeding the Strength of Legions and Fleets. * *Alexander the Great* was well appriz'd of this, for he himself own'd his Defect in this Point: Nor was † *Augustus Cæsar* less ignorant of it, who, after he had adopted *Tiberius*, made him adopt *Germanicus*, tho' he had a Son before.

MISFORTUNES merit justly to be reckon'd in the next Place; for, while the Affairs of a *Prince* prosper, his whole Subjects are *Rivals* in Obedience; but when they come to be ruffled, all equally abhor and withdraw their *Allegiance* from him.

LASTLY, we may reckon want

* Q. Curt. lib. 6.

† Tacit. Annal. lib. 1.

of *Troops*, *Money*, and *Friends*; for a Prince without an *Army* cannot punish stubborn and rebellious Subjects; without *Money* he grows despicable, nor can he do one great or glorious Action; and when he is divested of *Friends*, he loses, in every Body's Opinion, being look'd on as a private Person, and consequently must be the less respected.

If we consider the Matter in relation to *Foreigners*, a mean Opinion of the *State* is of much worse Consequence than a pitiful one of a *Prince* (tho' he be a Person of Conduct) without *Forces*; that is, the Power to strike Terror: But 'tis quite otherwise consider'd in regard to *Subjects*, who, let the Prince's *Forces* be never so small, may be oppress'd by them. On the other hand, the Folly of a *Prince* may enhance the Power and Authority of a *Subject* to that Degree, that the rest may forget their *natural Lord*: But as to *Foreigners*, tho' the Character of the *Prince* be mean and pitiful, they may be gallantly rebuted by the same
State;

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State; whence it comes to pass, that some *Princes* acquire vast Characters with foreign *Powers*, and are little regarded by their own *Subjects*; while others are not only obey'd, but ador'd at home, and still in no manner of Reputation among Foreigners.

ANOTHER Cause which produces *Contempt*, is, when a Prince has had Predecessors void of *Courage*; for two Successions of pusillanimous *Princes* are enough to make a State *contemptible*; and if the Government be *Hereditary*, 'tis presumable that the Son will resemble the *Father*. Another Cause is, neglecting to punish those who have causelessly despis'd one's *Predecessor*; for which Reason * *Trajan* punish'd *Casperius Elianus*, Prefect of the *Prætorian Bands*, and those seditious Soldiers that had risen against *Nerva*.

BESIDES these, employing *Ministers* and Courtiers of mean *Parts*: a

* *Dion, Life of Trajan.*

Court without *Magnificence*; the letting any *Injury* pass with Impunity (in the Beginning of one's Reign chiefly) or any *Subject's* daring to contradict and oppose him; a Notion entertain'd by Mankind of his want of *Courage* or Power to resent Injuries, or not punishing with Alertness; and endeavouring to root any *Abuse* out of his *Kingdom* without *succeeding* in it; which made * *Tiberius* doubt, whether he ought to try to moderate the *Luxury* of *Rome* or no.

To the *Causes* already mention'd, we may add a *Backwardness* in Subjects to *esteem* their Princes; and all these *Qualities* in Princes are *Enemies* to Majesty, Royal Authority, Power and Virtue; which last are the only sure *Basis* of Government: And these Things likewise that destroy *Admiration* and *Fear* (from which duly compounded *Respect* and *Reverence* issue) diminish a *Prince's* Character, and render him likewise *contemptible*.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 3.

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So far 'tis sure that a *Prince* ought to avoid falling into *Contempt*, preserve *Respect*, and maintain a suitable *Decorum*, not by rigorous *Punishments*, but *Prudence*, as *Isocrates* advis'd *Nicocles*; not by *Moroseness* and *Austerity* of Looks, but by managing one's own Conduct agreeably, like * *Evagoras* King of *Salamis*; not by *secretting* one's self from Conversation, or a certain *Stiffness* in Discourse, but by tempering *Majesty*, *Courtesy* and *Affability*, like the Emperor *Titus Vespasian*; for when a Prince takes another Course, tho' he avoid *Contempt*, he will be apt to split on *Hatred*, which is equally destructive.

WE may likewise observe here, that *Hatred* is much sooner incurr'd by Princes, than *Contempt*, for no one submits his Neck willingly to the Yoke; but *Respect* to Princes being suck'd in with the Nurse's Milk, enters early and intimately into the Soul, and is hardly

* *Isocrat.* in *Evag.*

lost; wherefore the high Estate of *Princes* needs to fear nothing less than * *Fall* and *Contempt*: nor can a Prince, who has the Power and Reins in his Hands, ever become *contemptible*, if he does not first render himself so.

RESPECT is easier recover'd after one has incurr'd *Contempt*, than *Affection* after *Hatred*, because a Subject returns soon to his Duty to his Prince, for 'tis natural to him; and *Fear*, (which is inseparable from the Person of the Prince) begets *Respect*. *Love* depends on the *Will* of the Subject, and one Act of Severity will strike Terror into a great *many*; but good Offices done to any *One* before the Passion of *Hatred* is form'd, will scarcely oblige the *Receiver*.

CONSIDERING a Prince with relation to *Foreign* Princes; tho' he falls sooner into *Hatred* than *Contempt* with them, by reason of every Prince's being naturally *jealous* of another (whence

* Plin. Paneg.

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spring Hatred and Malevolence) yet when a Prince has once gotten a mean *Character* in the World, *Esteem* is not so soon regain'd as *Affection* or a good Correspondence; because *Affectation* of Power, and *pretending* to it where it is not, are of no Significancy either to a bordering *Prince*, or one at a distance, who know the real *Want* of Forces and Courage.

IF we look upon a Prince as fall'n under the Contempt of his own *Subjects*, it is to be consider'd, that the Species of Contempt, which arises from Want of *Children*, fix'd *Succeffors*, *Friends* and *Allies*, contributes much more powerfully towards his *Expulsion*, then the Want of the other Goods of *Fortune*. The Want of the fore-mention'd Endowments of the Mind, paves the Way to *Disobedience*; and that kind of Contempt which springs from a Deficiency of Troops, Money, Friends and Allies, is apt to produce *Invasions*.

IT

IT is not every Degree of Contempt that creates *Change*; that only is sufficient, which has entirely defac'd *Obedience* and *Fear*, and is arriv'd to Excess; for Men arrive at that Pitch, after having run thro' many Stages of Contempt. This is so much the greater, in Proportion to the Number and Weight of the *Causes* that concur to produce it, and the Length of Time that the *Prince* has lain under it. There are other Circumstances requisite, besides a Prince's rendring himself *mean* and *cheap*; but there must at the same Time be a Person who actually attempts to usurp the *Throne*. The first Degree of Contempt is, when the Subjects exceed the Limits of their *Duty*, by offering mutual and open Injuries: Next to that, when the *Ministers* come to be despis'd; then, when the Prince's *Orders* are ridicul'd: Farther, opposing him on slight Occasions; actually denying Obedience: And lastly, rising in *Arms* in order to usurp the *Throne*, or alter the Government.

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CONTEMPT opens a Way to three Species of Change, from the fore-mention'd different Degrees of it; *viz.* either among the Factions of the Nobility, caus'd by the low Opinion they conceive of the *Prince*, which prompts them to have recourse to the Assistance of *Foreigners*, the Consequence of which is the Ruin of the Government. Another rises from the Ambition of some over-grown *Subject*, who, when, thro' the Folly of the *Prince*, he has strengthen'd his Party, Correspondence and Power among the *Populace*, surmounts all Obstacles, and takes Possession of the *Throne*. The last Scene of Change springs from an *Association* form'd among the powerfullest Subjects, who, disdaining to be govern'd by so mean and dastardly a *Prince*, grasp the Administration.

CERTAIN it is, that a Change is not to be hinder'd when Contempt rises to that Pitch of Excess; which will so much the more certainly happen, if the *State* chances to be in a weak

weak Condition, and there be *one* Person in it who is far superior to his fellow *Subjects* in Ability, or can turn and wind the *Prince* as he pleases; or if the *Army* be corrupt and insolent: because a decaying *State* will not be able to produce a *Man* to stem the Torrent. Excess of *Power* will patronize any Commotion or Alteration that may be attempted, and an Authority acquir'd over the *Prince* will easily dissolve the *Unity* of the Government, disunite the *Counsellors* about him, debilitate his *Arms*, confound *Justice*, and involve him in the dangerous *Toils* of *Fraud* and *Artifice*: Add to this, the Corruption and *Insolence* of the *Army*, which opens a plain broad Path to *Usurpation*.





CHAPTER VI.

Concerning the different Species of Changes that Kingdoms are subject to: And why one sort of Change takes Place sooner than another.



MONARCHY may undergo more sorts of Changes than any other Species of Government, because it may be chang'd either into an *Oligarchy* or *Democracy*; besides, *Foreigners* may possibly seize on the Government; or of an *Elective Monarchy* it may become *Hereditary*; or of *Hereditary, Elective*; or may come to be divided among many *Succeffors*.

THAT *Monarchy* may change into *Oligarchy*, we see by the * *Lacedæmonians* and *Carthaginians* after *Charilaus's* Time: or into a *Democracy*, as

* Arift. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 12.

it did in *Rome* after the Expulsion of
 * *Tarquin*: or of *Hereditary* become
Elective, as in the Case of † *Galba*
 after the Family of the *Cæsars* be-
 came extinct with *Nero*: or of *Elec-*
tive become *Hereditary*, as is evident
 from the fixing of the *Roman Empire*
 in the Race of ‡ *Charlemain*: or it
 may be divided amongst any Number
 of *Successors*, as it happen'd in the
 Empire after the Death of *Constantine*
the Great. These Revolutions cannot
 happen in an *Oligarchy*; for if the
Form is not alter'd, 'tis odds but the
 Government remains with the *Nobles*;
 nor to a *Democracy*, because if the
Multitude prevails, the Government
 must of Necessity remain with the
People: And on the other hand, these
 two *Forms* of Government may con-
 tract or extend themselves to a greater
 or smaller Number, so that in a *De-*
mocracy All may be comprehended,
 except the very Lees of the *People*, or

* Liv. lib. 1.

† Tacit. Hist. ibid.

‡ Aurel, Vict.

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any one vastly rich Man in an * *Oligarchy*: or the whole *Multitude* may not be admitted into the Administration in a † *Democracy*; or it may happen that the *Rich* and the *Nobles* of such a Number and Quality may have the executive Part in an ‡ *Oligarchy* (which cannot befall a *Monarchy*); so that dilating and contracting the Executive Power are common to all other *Forms*.

SUCH is the Nature of *Monarchy*, that it is more easily chang'd into an || *Oligarchy* than any other Form, for this Reason; because, when a *Prince*, deviating from the Ways of Justice, commits any notable Excesses, the *Nobility* are they that are aptest to resent his Insolence and Incroachments; and if the same Disposition prevails among the *Commons*, they joyn either in his Expulsion, or his Murder. As the

* Arist. Pol. lib. 4. cap. 4.

† Idem cap. 5.

‡ Idem lib. 5. cap. 1.

|| Polyb. Hist. lib. 6.

* in KINGDOMS. 93

Nobles are superior in Dignity to the *Commons*, the latter sit down contentedly under their Government, because they either do not discern and distinguish so nicely, or are not so easily united. Besides, the *Few* that are suppos'd to attempt their own Deliverance, are better qualify'd to ruin a *Prince*, than any *one* Man can be; they have the Pretence of *Liberty* and *Common Good*, which no single Man has a Title to that grasps at the Government, and would succeed the expell'd or murder'd Prince.

NEXT to this, *Monarchy* may sooner degenerate into a *Tyranny* than a *Democracy*, because a single *Person* has many more ways of possessing himself of the Government, and always a larger Share of Ambition than the *Multitude*, which arms against the Prince with Reluctancy, and rarely thirsts after Sovereignty, but is usually content when it is not oppress'd. And tho' (considering the Progress of *Nature's* Changes, which never jumps from one Extreme to another without

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passing thro' the requisite Means) let it appear never so difficult for *Monarchy* to be chang'd into a *Democracy*, it is not always first chang'd into an *Oligarchy*, which is the *Mean* between the two Extremes: She goes another way to work in *Moral* Operations, such as the *Revolutions* of Kingdoms, which depend on the *Free-Will* of Men, by changing immediately into a *Democracy* without stopping at an *Oligarchy*, as is manifest in the History of *Rome* after the Expulsion of * *Tarquin*, in *Athens* after the Extinction of the Sons of † *Pisistratus*, and in *Syracuse* after ‡ *Gelo*.

HERE it will be proper to take Notice, that tho' *Revolutions* may be brought about in other Forms of Government without Force, yet it will be the hardest Thing in the World to do it in a *Monarchy*, because 'tis Madness to imagine that the *Succession*

* Liv. lib. 1.

† Thucyd. lib. 6.

‡ Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. ult.

should

should at once fail, seeing it extends in Kingdoms almost *in infinitum*; and in the Case where all Pretenders to the State lay down their Arms, it might easily put on a new Form without any Disturbance; or when the *Usurper* voluntarily resigns the Supreme Power, as *Sylla* did; or when the *Prince* by Donation or Will makes it over to another, as *Attalus* did *Asia*, *Cottius* the *Alps*, *Ptolemy* the *Cyrenenses*, *Nicomedes* *Bithynia*, and *Polemon* *Pontus*, who all left the *Roman* People Heir to their vast Possessions.

THE Circumstances and *Dispositions* which occasion a Kingdom's putting on this or that sort of *Change* are so many, various, and different, that no certain Rule can be laid down, whereby to know in what Form of Government it will terminate. The chief Things to be consider'd in order to attain this Knowledge in the best manner, are the several Conditions of the *State* and the *Prince*, the Nature of the *Cause*, the *End*, and the *Subjects*; for if the State is anciently *Hereditary*,

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ditary, and never enjoy'd (at least for a long Time backwards) the Principles of *Liberty*, because its Laws were not calculated for a *Republican Mexican*, it will be the most difficult Matter in the World to convert it into a *Republic*: But any Man in Power, either because he has the Command of the *Army*, a numerous *Vassallage* and Reputation, or is excessive *Rich* and Powerful, or has a plausible Reason or *Pretext*, may seize the Kingdom. If the State ever enjoy'd, or has been founded in Principles of *Liberty*, it changes the more easily into a *Republic*; and the same Thing will happen, tho' it never enjoy'd the Principles of *Liberty*, if it chanches to be furnish'd with Laws and Customs properly *Political* or *Republican*. If the State in Progress of Time has still deviated more and more from its first Principles, it will change into that kind of *Government* to which it has been approaching for the Time that it declin'd from its Principles. If by the natural Constitution of the State it entertains a large Standing *Army*, and the Army either has a *Right*, or pretends

pretends to it, or usurps the Right of electing the *Prince*, it will be a hard Matter to stamp any other Form of Government on that State than *Tyranny*; because, accusom'd as *Armies* generally are to Insolence, they cannot down with any other *Form*, and are easily corrupted with Artifice and Money by any ambitious *Bidder*, as is plainly collected from the *Roman History*, by the many Changes that the Empire suffer'd after the Death of *Nero*.

If the Constitution of the State has at any Time chang'd, and of an *Hereditary* one become *Elective*, the same Event will take Place, as it did in the Case of * *Otho*, who rebell'd against *Galba*, who had chang'd it from an Hereditary to an Elective Empire. If from an *Elective* one it becomes *Hereditary*, it returns without Difficulty to its ancient Form, as the † *Roman Empire* did after the Extinction of

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

† Aurel. Vict.

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the Race of *Charlemain*. When it is *Elective*, and the Right of Choice is vested in the *Nobles* and Great Men of the State, it is most likely to decline into the Form of an *Oligarchy*, because they virtually resemble one another, and the *Electors*, who are equal in Power (in case of the Prince's ceasing to govern according to *Law*) either expel, or put him to Death, and are very hardly brought to a new *Election*, by reason of their Sufferings being fresh imprinted in their Minds. But if the Right of Election is in the *People*, collectively taken, it will be easier for *One* to usurp the Supreme Power, who either depends upon, or is related to the *Royal Family*; because the *People* will not suffer the Government to rest in an *Oligarchy*, and the *Senate* will not dare to give any Opposition to the *Usurper*; as it was in the Case of *Tarquinius Superbus* after the Death of *Servius Tullius*. If the *Army* has likewise a Right to elect, and is both numerous and unanimous, let the *People* and *Senate* make never so much Opposition, he will always succeed to the Throne,

Throne, who is favour'd and follow'd
by the *Soldiery*.

If the Prince is so young that it is
not in his Power to injure his Sub-
jects, the Revolution must needs be
attempted by some very near Relation,
or by those who are charg'd with his
Education, especially if they are am-
bitious; or by some *Subject* in great
Power, desirous of Rule; for in this
Case the *Few* are depriv'd of the Pre-
text of the *Publick Good*, nor have the
Multitude an Opportunity to rise (as
we may see in the Instance of * *Philip*
the Tutor of *Gordian*, who depriv'd
him both of his Empire and Life; and
in † *Lewis* the *Moor*, who seiz'd his
Nephew's Government, and many
others) except where the *Ministers* are
become so haughty and avaritious, that
they are insupportable: This Case,
however, can seldom happen; and
when it does, they would scarcely vio-
late the Person of the *Prince*. If the

* Capitolin. in Gord.

† Guicc. Hist. lib. 1.

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Prince is of a different *Religion*, the Government will the more easily fall to his Share who is the chief Affirmer of the *Religion* of the *Subjects*; or into an *Oligarchy*, if the *Few* can procure the Voice of the *People* to be on their side, under the Pretext of *Religion*; or it may change into a *Republick*, if the Religion of the Subjects is adverse to *Kingly* Government; for in this Case they would likewise suspect the Government of the *Few*. If the Prince be an *Usurper*, the State may probably retake its ancient *Form* of Government, as * *Athens* did after the Destruction or Expulsion of the Sons of *Pisistratus*. If the Prince wants a *Successor*, the Administration glides most naturally into the Hands of the *Nobility*, because the *People* are us'd to *Servitude*, and never dream of recovering their *Liberties*, so that the *Nobles* easily establish themselves in an *Aristocracy*: But if the Prince who wants a *Successor* has been the Founder of the *State*, in that Case it would

* Thucyd. lib. 6.

soon become *Elective*, because the People would reject an *Oligarchy*, nor would they take the Administration to themselves, by reason of their never having tasted the Sweets of *Liberty*, as it happen'd in *Rome* after the Death of * *Romulus*; and this will happen so much the sooner, if there is no one Person among the *People* who is greatly to be preferr'd to the rest. If the Prince's *Accession* is fresh in every one's Memory, and the Kingdom has been transferr'd to a *Foreign* Line, the Throne may be easily possess'd by any Subject born within the Realm that is descended of the *Royal Family*, or can alledge any specious Pretence for his Succession. And the Case will be the same even with a *Prince* born in the Kingdom, if he has been educated among *Foreigners*, and differs from his Subjects in his *Manners*, as we may plainly see by † *Vonones*, who was expell'd *Parthia* by *Artabanus* for that Reason. If the Prince regnant is an

* Liv. lib. 1.

† Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

Usurper,

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Usurper, either he that was expell'd, or his Sons, or Successors, may, without any great Difficulty, recover Possession after his Death, especially if their Place of Residence is at no great Distance from their *Kingdom*, and if they were, generally speaking, be- lov'd. If the Prince has both a good *Title* and governs *uprightly*, it will be a very hard Matter to compass a *Re- volution*; but if it should happen, the *State* would either only change *Hands*, or change into an *Oligarchy*, because Ambition was the sole Motive; and tho' the *Title* is never so unjust, if the Administration is but *upright*, Things will take the same Course, because the *People* will be universally satisfy'd. But if the Administration be *Arbitrary* and unjust, as well as the *Title*, then the Diversity of the *Cause* and *End*, and the Nature of the *Subjects*, point out the particular Species of *Change*.

W H E N the *Cause* of Change pro- ceeds from the *Hatred* of the Subject swell'd to a vast Degree, a *Republican* Form of Government will quickly
take

take place among a Warlike People, as it happen'd in * *Rome* after the Expulsion of the Kings: The same happens, if the *Hatred* is conceiv'd on the account of lost *Liberty*, or extravagant *Innovations*, or a continu'd *Series* of Injuries, or from intolerable *Taxes* and *Impositions*; because, as they are all Sufferers, they all contribute to the *Change*: and, as the *People* seldom keep Measures, or act within due Bounds, when once they have rid themselves of the *Tyranny*, they think of nothing but sharing it among them, and therefore persecute the *Prince's* Friends and Relations to Death; whence Executions and Exiles, or any Measures that may confirm the *People* in Possession, as it was at *Athens* after the Death of *Pisistratus*, and after *Hieronimus* in *Syracuse*. In this Case, when the *People* joyn with the *Nobles* (out of an Abhorrence to the *Prince*) to expel or murder him, the Change is always popular, because they grow haughty and arrogant, and disdain to

* Liv. lib. 1.

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submit to any Government but their own, as (beside the fore-mention'd Example of *Rome*) in the Case of the * *Calcidians* after the Death of the Tyrant *Phoxus*, and in *Ambracia* after the Expulsion of the Tyrant *Periander*.

WHEN *Contempt* is the Cause, it seldom influences the *People* to that Degree as to raise a Rebellion, but paves the Way to an *Oligarchy* or to *Tyranny*; because, when the † Prince looks mean in the Eyes of the *Nobility* or Men in Power, they (or one of them at least) set up for the Government, and he generally succeeds in the Attempt who has great *Authority* with the Prince, or enjoys some *Post* of Consequence, and is in Reputation for his Courage; this was the Case of *Pepin*, who depos'd *Childeric* the last King of the *Merovean* Race, and made himself *King* of *France*. This will happen so much the sooner, if the Prince is proud, rash, and ambitious;

* *Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 4.*

† *Idem cap. 10.*

which

which was the Case of * *Astyages* depos'd by *Cyrus*, and *Amodocus* by *Seutes* the *Thracian*. If *Encroachment* is the Cause, the Government commonly changes to an *Oligarchy*, because the *Few* are the least Sufferers; and when the *People* are the Sufferers, the *Few* that are in Power commonly seize on the Government, on Pretence of acting for the *Publick Good*.

WHEN usurping the *Crown* is the propos'd *End*, the State sinks frequently under a *Tyranny*; because that is a Distemper that seldom seizes the *People*; and very few of that sort of Men that are influenc'd by *Ambition* can agree in the same *End*, especially if there is any *One* amongst them who is much more powerful than the rest. When the *End* propos'd is a Deliverance from Vexations, Oppressions and Grievances impos'd by the *Ambitious*, the State throws itself into an *Oligarchy*, because their Misfortunes unite them; but if the Body of the *Subjects* prove the Suf-

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

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ferers, it changes into a *Popular State*, because all are alike out of Humour with the *Government*, and are even jealous of an *Oligarchy*. When the *End* is the Recovery of *Liberty*, the first *Form* takes place easily (if it was a *Popular* one) because it is the Interest of every one that it should. When the *effectual Causes* do not direct the View to a *Revolution*, but only to the Death of the *Prince*; such are Anger, Disdain, Glory, religious Zeal, Revenge, Fear, and the like; that *Form* of Government takes place which best befits the Nature of the *Subjects*, and the present State of the *Kingdom*.

WHEN *Subjects* have been always accustom'd to live under a *Monarchy*, and never under any other *Form* of Government, if Commotions should happen, they are not apt to receive any other *Form*, because they want the Advantage of knowing the Good of *Republican Institution*, nor are their *Laws* and *Customs* agreeable to a *Civil Life*. Besides that, it is harder for People long us'd to *Servitude* to learn how to govern

govern themselves, than for a *Free State* to degenerate into *Servitude*, and preserve themselves in that Condition; whence it happens, that while they have no *Prince* at their Head, they may be rather said to live in a State of *Licence* than *Liberty*, and therefore return willingly to their ancient *Subjection*, that is, delight more in *Servitude* than *Liberty*; like the * *Armenians*, who were uneasy without a King.

IF the *Subjects* are effeminate, base, weak, and born for *Servitude*; or unpolish'd, barbarous, or incapable of living under a *Republican Government*; the *Event* will be the same, because *Monarchy* is the only *Form* that will suit them.

WHEN *Subjects* have Courage, Warlike Dispositions, and are desirous of *Liberty*, they never will subject themselves to any other sort of Government but that of a *Republick*.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 1.

WHEN *Subjects* are not only well dispos'd to, but desire to live under a *Monarchical* Government; tho' particular Men may attempt to new mould the *State*, they miss their Aim commonly, the *State* having imbib'd Customs and Dispositions opposite to those of a *Republick*; as will appear evidently from the Instance of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, who, notwithstanding the Death of *Cæsar*, could not re-instate *Rome* in its ancient *Liberty*, because *Cæsar* was generally belov'd, and it agreed very well with *Monarchy*, being tir'd out with the *Civil Wars*; and likewise abounded with *Vices* destructive to a *Republick*. Hence it comes to pass, that when such *Dispositions* take place amongst *Subjects*, tho' the *Prince* is expell'd or depos'd, and has not one of his *Family* left to succeed him, the *Monarchy* will rather change into an *Elective one* than into a *Republick*, as it appears by the Election of *Galba* after the Expulsion and Deposition of *Nero*.

WHEN

WHEN *Kingly* Government becomes the Aversion of *Subjects*, and they have good Dispositions towards a *Republican* one; if proper Hands try to induce a new *Form*, it is easily brought to bear; as when the first * *Brutus* gave Liberty to *Rome* (which it had never tasted of before) by the Expulsion of the *Tarquins*, because the *Citizens* were well dispos'd to a *Republican* Government, and that Disposition was seconded by a general Aversion to *Kings*.

IF *Subjects*, or they of the greatest Ability in the State, do not appear to be Enemies to *Kingly* Government, but only hate the Person of the *Prince*, the *Form* may, without great Opposition, be chang'd to that of a *Tyranny* of any *one* that has Partizans and Strength sufficient, or has corrupted those that have, to come over to his *Party*; as Experience shews in the Case of *Otho*, who stepp'd easily into

* Liv. lib. 1.

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† *Galba's* Throne, because he left no Stone unturn'd to muster up a Party, and found that the *Soldiers* both despis'd and hated *Galba*.

THE same Thing may be effected, if the *Subjects* call in one of the Royal *Family*; as it was in the Case of * *Phraates*, who was recall'd by the *Parthians* to assist in the Expulsion of *Artabanus*. But if a *Revolution* happens at a Time when the *Subjects* have just submitted to *Servitude*, the State will easily return to that *Form* which it enjoy'd before their *Liberties* and the *Crown* were usurp'd: And tho' a State be long us'd to *Servitude*, yet, if it has contracted *Dispositions* repugnant to *Monarchy*, that State (when ever a Change is attempted) will put on that *Form* which is most agreeable, and suits those *Dispositions* best.

THE several *Qualities* of the *Nobility* and *Commons*, which consist chiefly

† Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 6.

in their *mutual* Proportions, in the Exercise of *Arms*, in the *Administration* of Publick Affairs, and in their *Union*, byas the Government (when a Change does happen) more towards one kind of *Form* than another; for if the *Nobles* are few and weak, and want the due Proportion of *Treasure* to render them equal to the *Multi- tude*, it must in that Case change to a * *Republick*: For this *Reason* the Government of *Florence* became † *Re- publican*, after the Expulsion of the Duke of *Athens*. If the *Commons* are powerful, and addicted to War, the Change will prove a *Popular* one; as 'tis evident by the Expulsion of the *Tarquins*, at which Time the power- ful and warlike *Commons* of *Rome* chang'd their Government into a ‡ *Re- publick*; and the greater Advances they made in Power, they form'd them- selves into a Republick so much the more perfect. The Reverse will hap-

* Aristot. Pol. lib. 4. cap. 12.

† Villan. Hist. lib. 12. cap. 11.

‡ Liv. lib. 1.

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pen when the *Nobles* are numerous, and inur'd to Arms, or out-balance the *Commons* by their *Riches*; therefore when the *Genouese* recover'd their *Liberty*, the *Nobility* happening to preponderate in *Riches*, the State fell into the Form of an *Aristocracy*. Likewise where the *Nobility* govern in all *Affairs* of a Publick Nature, and the *Commons* are either entirely excluded, or only admitted to a small Share, when a Revolution happens, the Government settles naturally in an *Aristocracy*. If the *Nobility* are few, but chance to have among them a *Person* of vastly greater Abilities than the rest, he will be apt, in case of a Revolution, to set himself at the Head of the *State*. When there are *Lords* possess'd of great Vassallages in a State that differ little in Power or Quality, as it is almost impossible for it to change to a *Republick*, so by Parity of Reason it will be exceeding hard for any one of them to seize the *Crown*, because the *Commons* are much inferior in Power, and the *Emulation* among the *Lords* so great, that none will admit
of

of a *Superior*, and consequently prove a Check to one another; whence they will either change for an *Aristocracy*, or call in some *Foreigner*. As no Form of Government can take place but a *Monarchical* one, where there is a great Disproportion among the Subjects; so where the Equality is great, no *Change* can introduce any Form but a * *Republican* one, as is evident from the *Swiss Cantons*, when they rebell'd against their *Prince*. When the *Nobility* are neither unanimous, nor belov'd by the *Commons*, any *One* has a better Opportunity of setting up for *Tyranny*, than changing it either to a *Republick* or an *Oligarchy*, because one Side will oppose the other, and both will sooner condescend to be govern'd by an indifferent Person that is of an Extraction neither *Noble* nor *Plebeian*, who seemingly favours neither Side; or on Condition he is of the *Nobility*, inclines to favour the *Commons*. And if the *Nobility* are divided among themselves, but well affected to the

* Guicciard. lib. 10.

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Commons, that State may easily be chang'd to a *Republick*.

'Tis to be observ'd, in regard to the several sorts of *Revolutions* that a *Monarchy* is capable of, that tho' it may in all Appearance seem dispos'd more to one *Form* than another, both on account of the *Circumstances* of the *Prince* and *State*, as well as the *Nature* of the *Cause*, *End*, and *Subjects*; yet such *Accidents* may interfere in the Article of *Mutation* which may divert it to a quite different *Form*, even contrary to the *Intention* of those who are the *Instruments*. Hence, they who attempt it in order to seize on the *Government*, or to change the *Form* of it, do not always obtain their *Ends*, tho' they do a *Change*. Experience teaches likewise, that the *Revolution*, generally speaking, terminates in that *Form*, to which most of the *Reasons* of *State* incline it; some of which dispose it to receive the *Form* of an *Oligarchy*, some that of a *Monarchy*, and some others that of a *Republick*.

BUT

BUT tho' a *Monarchy* may stand its Ground, *Dispositions* utterly destructive to its Nature may creep in by degrees; either by *Education* among People that are Enemies to it, or by unadvisedly granting too much *Liberty*, or by permitting such *Counsels* to prevail as are only proper for *Republicans*, and the like; which Inconveniencies a *Prince* ought to avoid carefully if he would guard against a *Revolution*; for tho' *Errors* in this kind may appear slight at first, and scarce worth Notice, yet as they are perpetually possessing the Minds of the *Subjects* with a Spirit of *Liberty*, they prey on the very Vitals of *Monarchy*, and at length swell to that Degree and become so fatal, that a *Revolution* proves unavoidable.

WE ought likewise to weigh the Nature of the Conditions of *Prince* and *People*, the Importance of the *Cause*, the *End*, and the *Subjects*, to know in what *Form* the Change will terminate; but we shall always find that the *Condition* of the *Subjects* influences

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most, and is consequently the best *Index* to point out the *Species* or Form.

WHEN many *Causes* contribute to work a Revolution, the most powerful *Cause* will determine the *Form* of *Government*, as it was formerly in *Rome*; for the Wrong done to *Brutus* and *Collatinus*, together with the general *Odium* of the People, were the *Causes* that occasion'd the Expulsion of *Tarquin*: But as the *Odium* was the most powerful of the two, being rooted in the Aggregate of the *People*, the Government became *Popular*.

WHEN the *People* stand universally well affected to the *Prince*, let him suffer by Death or Expulsion, the *Nation* will naturally espouse his Interest, or that of his *Descendants* and *Successors*. Besides, if ever the *Prince* happens to be murder'd or expell'd in any sudden Commotion or Insurrection, the State will rather fall into downright *Anarchy*, than put on any settled Form of *Government*, especially if the *People* have groan'd long under
Servi-

Servitude, because, as they naturally run from one *Extreme* to another, they break out into the highest Degree of *Licence* without the least Regard to *Superiority*: or the same will happen, if the * *Nobility* and *Commons* are so equally match'd, that neither Party will yield to the other; or if the *Commons* are vastly superior, as it happen'd at *Florence* after the Expulsion of the † Duke of *Athens*.

LASTLY, we may lay it down for certain, that a *Revolution* ought not, at least that it will be fruitlessly attempted when the *Prince* is generally esteem'd, and the *Rebels* unassisted by a Foreign *Prince* with Money, Arms, and Advice; and when neither the Hardships impos'd by the *Prince* on his *Subjects*, nor his Ambition or Power are become *exorbitant*, no Success can accompany an Attempt of that Nature, or any Man's Abilities be sufficient to bring it to bear.

* Guic. lib. 1.

† Villan. lib. 11. cap. 20.



C H A P. VII.

What kind of Persons are fittest to carry on a Change of Government: What the common Inducements are that make them attempt it: And what sort of People engage in Enterprizes of that Nature.



THAT we may the better discover what Persons are properest to be employ'd in changing the Form of a *Monarchy*, it will be necessary to state the Difference between a *Change* and an *Alteration* only, the *Condition* of the Kingdom, and the *Qualities* requisite in the Persons that bring it to pass.

To explain the foremention'd Distinction; A *Change* or *Revolution*, which is a Work of Moment, capable of giving a new *Form* to the Government, and of turning out one *Prince* to make

make Way for another (the ultimate End of all Commotions) requires Time, Ability, Opportunity, Courage, and sometimes considerable Assistance to compleat it. The *Persons* therefore that have Dexterity sufficient to excite *Riots* and *Tumults*, may not be able to work a *Revolution*; for it appears manifestly that a *Mob* may be raised, an *Army* new modell'd, and yet the *Ringleader* has not been able to *usurp* the Government, or change the *Form* of it.

As for the *Condition* of the *State*, if it has lately chang'd its *Nature*, and is become *corrupt* and much alter'd for the worse; a Man of very mean Parts may create a *Revolution*, whether he reaps the Benefit of it or no, because the *Matter* is dispos'd to his Hand to receive the Impression: So two common Soldiers of *Rome* presum'd to make * *Otho* Emperor (who had no *Title* to it) and deprive *Galba* already elected; the Design succeeded, be-

* Tacit. Hist. lib. I.

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cause the Constitution of the Empire had lately been chang'd at *Galba's Accession*, viz. by becoming *Elective* after the Death of *Nero*; the *Soldiers* had been corrupted by *Donatives*, and the whole *Government* debauch'd by *Nero's Extravagance*. Where no *Corruption* has crept in, that Prince may rest satisfy'd that nothing can disturb his Administration.

MANY great *Qualities* must center in the Person who undertakes to manage a Revolution, and with all these Advantages it will be next to impossible to bring it about, because when the Subject *Matter* is not dispos'd to receive every *Form* that Ambition would impress on it, there's no great Likelihood of his succeeding. Daily Experience confirms this Truth, not only in a *Monarchical*, but any other *Form* of Government; whereby 'tis evident, that if the Subject *Matter* is not already *corrupted*, and the Season proper for *Innovating*, whoever attempts a Change of Government, not only labours in vain, but makes a
very

very unfortunate *Exit*. *Spurius Cassius* and *Manlius Capitolinus* took both of them the most expeditious and proper Ways to make themselves *Tyrants* of *Rome* ; but because *Corruption* had not tainted the *Republick*, nor did the *Season* prove favourable to their Purposes, they only labour'd their own Destruction. Perhaps *Marius*, *Sylla*, and *Cæsar* did not spin their Politicks so fine, yet for all that, they met with better Success, because the *Republick* was corrupted to their Hands, and had deviated far from its *Principles*; wherefore, had they liv'd in the former Times, they would have succeeded no better; and if *Spurius* and *Manlius* had liv'd in their Days, they would have had the same good Fortune.

THE first *Brutus* succeeded in the Expulsion of *Tarquin*, and chang'd the Form of Government, because the *Romans* were enrag'd at *Tarquin's* *Tyrannical* Administration, and predispos'd for a *Change*: The second *Brutus* miss'd his Aim, even tho' he had succeeded in the Murder of *Cæsar*,
because

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because the *Romans* were not at that Time prepar'd for another *Form* of *Government*. * *Sejanus* try'd likewise to usurp the Imperial Dignity, and made many Steps towards it; but he fail'd in the *Event*, because the *Empire* was then *Hereditary*, and already establish'd in *Tiberius*; nor was the *Army* corrupted. † *Otho* succeeded for the Reasons already mention'd, viz. the Seeds of *Corruption* being sown among the *Soldiers*, and the *Empire's* being chang'd so lately by the Death of *Nero* from *Hereditary* to *Elective*.

WHEN a *State* is alter'd to that Degree, that its present *Form* of *Government* grows insufferable, any *Conspiracy* or *Commotion* may be safely attempted: The famous Insurrection that *Giovanni di Procida* carried on against the *French* with so great Secrecy and Ease, commonly known by the Name

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

† Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

of the *Sicilian Vespers*, is a most eminent Instance of this.

THE *Qualities* requisite in any Person that attempts a Change of *Form*, are either those of the *Mind*, *Power*, *Birth*, or of *Superiority*. They that are qualify'd by the *Mind* are the Ambitious, Proud, Bold, Turbulent, and Restless, King-haters, and such as undervalue their own Lives; because they are ever acted by a Thirst of *Liberty*, pant after *Innovations*, and are possess'd with a Desire of *Rule*.

UNDER the *Quality* of *Power* are comprehended * *Generals of Armies*, of which *Cyrus* (*Astyages's* General) is an Instance, who dethron'd him with his own Army. † *Governors of Kingdoms*; such as *Otho*, who govern'd *Portugal* under *Nero*. They who enjoy the *Executive* Part of both *Civil* and *Military* Power, at the same

* *Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.*

† *Sueton. in Oth.*

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time in the same Country, as * *Cassius* did, who try'd to make *Syria* (his native Country) rise in Arms against *Mark Anthony*. They that have *Vassallages*, *Relations*, and immense *Riches* in the Kingdom; which was the Case of † *Sinnaces* under *Artabanus* King of the *Parthians*; and it was the Reason why *Valerius Asiaticus* was thought the Man most capable of raising a *Rebellion* against the Emperor ‡ *Claudius* in *Germany*. They that have assisted the Prince in his *Conquests*, who, when they are not entirely satisfy'd, and possess the utmost Extent of their *Wishes*, reckon themselves *injur'd*; for which Reason || *Cyrus* caress'd all his Officers while he stay'd at *Babylon*. And they who *turn and wind* the Prince as they please, wanting nothing in effect but the *Sceptre*; as it was with *Pescennius* under *Commodus*, *Plautianus* under *Severus*, and

* *Dion. Life of Ant.*

† *Tacit. Annal. lib. 6.*

‡ *Tacit. Annal. lib. 11.*

|| *Xen. Cyrep. lib. 7.*

Sejanus

Sejanus with *Tiberius*; because these *Favourites* can easily put their Designs in Execution.

UNDER the Quality of *Birth* are included the Descendants of *Rebels*, because they inherit or imitate their *Father's Vices*; for this Reason * *Clasficus* was encourag'd to rebel against the *Roman Empire*. *Princes* of the *Blood*, because their Authority is considerable in all Commotions, as appears from the Instance of *Cyrus*, who rebell'd against his Brother *Artaxerxes*, after the Death of their Father *Darius*. And † *Vologeses* settled his Brothers *Pacorus* and *Tiridates* in Kingdoms, that he might receive no Disturbance from them. And *Pretenders* to Kingdoms, for turbulent Spirits will never be wanting to invite them; for which Reason, after ‡ *Cæsar* had put *Cleopatra* and her Brother in Possession of

* Tac. Hist. lib. 4.

† Tacit. Annal. lib. 15.

‡ Hirt. de bell. Alex.

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Egypt, he advis'd the Expulsion of *Arfinoe* the other Sister.

UNDER the Quality of *Superiority* are concluded the *Propagators* of new *Sects* and *Religions*, such as *Arduelles* and *Techelles*, two false Prophets, who had like to have overturn'd the Empires of *Turkey* and *Persia*. The Defenders of the *Publick Good* and *Liber-ties*, such as * *Arminius* set up for in *Germany*, because they are entire Masters of the *Multitude*. They who excel in *Eloquence* and *Military Skill*, because they have the Art of *Persuasion*, and can discipline the *People*. And *Ambassadors* who reside in *Kingdoms* under quite different Pretexts, as 'tis evident by the Example of † *Tarquin's Ambassadors*, who being admitted at *Rome* under the Colour of recovering their *Effects*, attempted a *Revolution* in the State, by corrupting the *Licentious Youth* of *Rome*; for they have

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 1.

† Plut. in Publicol.

more than common Opportunities of Plotting and Caballing.

THE *Motives* that may prompt and induce the Lovers of *Novelty* to affect *Change* are many; but the most *effectual* are, the being back'd and seconded by some *Person* in great Power; *Necessity*; open and universal *Hatred* to the Prince; and confirm'd Hopes of *Success*: Thus the Instigation of * *Mutianus* prompted *Vespasian* to declare against *Vitellius*: *Necessity* made † *Otho* rise against *Galba*: The universal *Hatred* which ‡ *Tarquin* was known to labour under, spirited up *Brutus* against him: And a settled *Hope* of *Success*, founded on the Predictions of *Ptolemy* the Astrologer, contributed to *Otho's* Elevation: Before him || *Telephus* conspir'd against *Octavius Cæsar*, he believing foolish-

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 2.

† Idem lib. 1.

‡ Liv. lib. 1.

|| Sueton. vit. Aug.

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ly, that *Fate* had determin'd his being *Emperor of Rome*.

THERE are many Kinds of Men, who, as soon as they see a *Leader* appear, immediately list under him in Hopes of a *Revolution*; which was the Case of the *Parthians* under the Administration of *Artabanus*, when * *Sinnaces* and his Father *Abdageses* appear'd to head them. But the Persons that most frequently fill up that † *Class*, are they that love to fish in troubled Waters, and live on the Hopes of thriving by *Sedition* and *Discord*: They who despair of ‡ *Advancement* in Times of Tranquillity, and judge it practicable during Commotions: The || *Poor*, and they who are drown'd in *Debt*: The ** *Inconstant, Vain*, desirous of *Novelty*, they who despise *Danger*, they who have born long

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 6.

† Idem lib. 11.

‡ Cic. 2. contr. Catilin.

|| Sal. bell. Jugur.

** Tacit. Hist. lib. 2.

Enmity

Enmity and Hatred to particular *Persons*: And they who have been *injur'd* by the *Prince*. If any one *Subject* enjoys all or the greater Number of the *Qualities* heretofore mention'd, and is spur'd on by any one or more of the *Motives* to *Change* likewise mention'd, 'twill be a difficult Matter to hinder a new Form of *Government* from taking Place, when the *Prince* is not very dextrous, just and powerful; especially if the *Pretenders* to the *Crown* are provided with *Assistance*, which Circumstance is all they expect to put their Designs in Execution.

IT is to be consider'd besides, that tho' such *Adventurers* may have *Forces*, but want a specious *Pretence* and *Spirit* to bear them up, they bestir themselves but faintly, even tho' they have various *Incentives* and *Motives*. *Foolhardiness* is too wild a Notion to enter any Man's Brain, and 'tis execrable in any Person to aspire to another's Right, and attempt to dispossess him of his *Throne*, when there is not the least *Pretext* for it.

THE

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THE most powerful, ambitious, ill-dispos'd Men, are always aiming at *Rule* and *Grandeur* to the utmost Extent of their Capacities, tho' they are link'd with *Fall* and *Ruin*: So deeply rooted in their Breasts is *Obstinacy*, or, to be plainer, *Madness*.

THE next in order to be consider'd, are the Men who have been advanc'd without *Desert*, Rhime or Reason, to disproportionable and high *Honours*, that ever hope and threaten farther and greater Extravagancies; especially such, who at first were so far from coveting them, that they could not tell how to set about the obtaining of them; for Mankind are apt to aspire unreasonably from one Degree of *Ambition* to another, and he who once comes to enjoy one Piece of undeserv'd good *Fortune*, never bounds or checks his *Desires* or *Hopes* afterwards.

WHEN * Men begin first to entertain *Hopes*, and to tread in the Paths

* Liv. lib. 4.

of Sway and *Dominion*, they meet with some Rubs and Difficulties; but when * they are once in, and have had Time to walk about a little, great and favourable Assurances start up all round them, and if their first Attempts meet with Success, they soon find more and more additional Helps. So the † *Defection* of the *Germans* follow'd the *Rebellion* of the *Dutch*; for which Reason their *Leader Civilis* entertain'd Hopes of drawing in other *Provinces*.

LASTLY, 'tis worth Notice, that *Adventurers* of this Kind leave commonly no Stone unturn'd to encrease their *Parties*, believing that the Danger lessens in Proportion to the Increase of Partizans (as it was with the People of ‡ *Chios*, who rebell'd against the *Athenians*) and that the very hearing of an *Insurrection* already begun, encourages others to engage in it; as

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

† Idem Hist. lib. 4.

‡ Thucyd. lib. 8.

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in the Case of the *Army* of the *Lower Germany* in the Reign of * *Tiberius*, which mutiny'd as soon as it heard of the Alterations made in *that* of the *Upper Germany*. A Revolution is the likelier to succeed, if a *Capital City* rebels; therefore the † *Athenians* fear'd that other Parts of their *Dominions* would follow the Example of *Chios*: And most of the Cities of ‡ *Normandy* follow'd the Example of *Roan*.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 1.

† Thucyd. ibid.

‡ Phil. de Comin. lib. 1. cap. 13.



CHAP.



CHAP. VIII.

Concerning the Methods which they commonly take, who attempt a Change of Government.



THE Means by which Changes are brought about, are principally of two Sorts, *viz.* those that are practis'd in the *Article of Execution*, either of the Death or Expulsion of the *Prince*, and those that he who undertakes to be the Conductor of the Affair thinks proper to use to *fit himself* for it, whether he favours the Interest of another *Person* in it, or whether he means the Revolution for his *own* Benefit, or would change the Form of *Government*.

WE intend only to treat of the Means of the *second* Sort, and particularly of that *Species* which the Conductor uses when he attempts a *Change*, to usurp the State. 'Tis a Matter of

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great Moment to discover these cruel and abominable Measures, that the World may know, that *Principles* of *Tyranny* are sometimes hid under the Appearances of *Virtue*, and that sacrilegious and ambitious Minds lurk under a dissembled *Modesty* and pretended *Affection* to the *Prince*. How different soever they may be, according to the Difference of Princes, States, Subjects, Times, and the Undertakers themselves, yet they may be all reduc'd to two Heads. The first is, For the *Undertaker* to approach as nigh as he possibly can to the *Point of Usurpation*. The second is, To carry the *Prince* as nigh as possible to the *Brink of Ruin*: Both these Aims are to be obtain'd by Application.

THE first View or Aim is obtain'd by endeavouring all the Ways that may be to acquire Authority, Power, Dependants, Confidence, and to be generally belov'd. *Authority* is acquir'd by being in the Possession of considerable *Preferments*, by *Continuance* in them, and by having the *Prince's Ear*; espe-

especially when 'tis evident that he *ingrosses* all his Favours. *Power* is obtain'd by heaping up Riches, by intermarrying with Families of Power and *Quality*, by laying Great Men under *Obligations*, by keeping up a Correspondence with neighbouring *Princes*, by having a good Body of *Troops* at Command near the Place where the Design is to be put in Execution, by holding *Intelligence* with the Governors of fortify'd Places, or those that command *Armies*, or are the *Ringleaders* of Factions, or are desirous of *Innovations*; or by preferring Relations to *great Posts*, in order to be the more secure of them; or else by trusting those *Places* with Persons of *mean Extraction*, who, by owing all that they have to their *Patron's* Favour, may be under a *Necessity* of following his Fortune.

SEJANUS was made *Prefect* of the * *Prætorian* Bands, which was the Emperor's Guard, and was continu'd

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

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in that as well as in other *Posts* of Consequence: He had the Dexterity to wind himself so much into his *Master's* Temper, that it look'd as if two Bodies had been inform'd by the same Soul: He was the *Minister* of all his Villanies, the *Partner* of all his most secret Thoughts; and that he might with more Security compass his Design of preparing and *moulding* him to what Shape he pleas'd, he took Care to persuade *Tiberius* that he had no *oblique* Views, and that their *Interests* were *one*: He found Means to dazzle his Eyes to that Degree, that *Tiberius* could never discover any thing in him, but what resembled his *own* most secret *Inclinations*: He fed and flatter'd *Tiberius* so, as to possess him with a confirm'd Opinion, that his most *criminal* Actions were *Virtues*, or at least but *Peccadilloes*: He labour'd industriously to *secrete* him from the Conversation of *Men of Probity*, and created *Seasons* and *Opportunities* of destroying his *Rivals* by the Hands of other Men: He brought about his Marriage with *Livia*: He
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laid the *Senators* under *Obligations* to him, by providing their *Relations* with Places: He encamp'd the *Prætorian* Bands in one Place (who were before dispers'd in *Rome*) under Pretence of securing *Tiberius* the better: He courted the *Soldiers*, who are naturally well affected to *Revolutions*: He contracted Friendships with the Subaltern Officers, and preferr'd his own *Relations*, and mean and villanous *People*.

CREATURES are made by bestowing *Money*, keeping *Promises*, a Readiness to *assist* others, and by administering Fuel to other Mens *Ambition*. *Confidence* is created in the Mind of a *Prince*, by appearing *zealous* for his Life and Service, by seeming to hate the Part *one* acts, and entirely free from the Lust of *Rule*; and in regard to others, by proceeding with *Constancy* and *Gratitude*.

GENERAL * *Benevolence* is acquir'd by aiding the *Necessitous*, defending

* Dion. lib. 37.

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the *Oppress'd*, by *protecting* those that seek it, by affecting the Character of a *Patriot*, by appearing to be a religious Promoter of *Justice*, compassionate and *liberal*, by hiding one's Greatness in *publick* under a Cloak of Humility, by affecting *Condescension* to cover one's Power, by giving out that he is the *Author* of all the Good that the *Prince* does, by shewing himself *humane* to all manner of People in publick and private, and by raising a *Belief* in them that he dissuades the *Prince* from intended Acts of *Cruelty*, from loading them with grievous *Burdens*, or from any unjust and violent *Actions*.

HAVING gone thro' these several Gradations, he must now take Care to make all the *Prince's* Favours appear to be owing to *himself*; the *Quality* must be corrupted by catering for every one's *Passions*, and that plentifully, to gain their Hearts; the *Party* must be augmented, and the Affections of the *Soldiery* obtain'd by filling up *Commissions* properly, calling them by
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their Names, and conversing *familiarly* with them, enquiring of the Condition of their *private* Affairs, particularly assisting them with *Money* and *Interest*, by being kind and beneficent to them, bestowing *Donatives* on some, and large *Promises* on others, giving full Scope to the *Dissolute*; by *inviting*, *entertaining*, and filling the Leading *Men* among them with great *Hopes*, and by bestowing *Posts* on none but *Creatures* and *Partizans*.

THIS Path * *Sejanus* took; for he went and convers'd familiarly with the Soldiers, call'd them by Names, chose their Centurions and Tribunes. † *Otho* went the same way too, but with better Fortune, for he accomplish'd his Point.

WHEN he has made so good Progress as to see himself grown powerful, belov'd and respected, follow'd, and all Mens Eyes and Affections set on

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

† Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

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him, his next Effort must be, to lead his *Prince* to the Brink of *Ruin*. This is to be done many Ways, the chief of which are to keep him continually immers'd in dishonest Pleasures, to persuade him to corrupt Ladies of *Quality*, to be *cruel*, to squander away his *Treasure* that he may become *neccessitous* and levy exorbitant *Taxes*, to ruin Men of *Figure*, to *bate* Men of *Virtue*, and to discourage *Trade*, to become jealous of his *Relations*, cruel to his very *Successors*, and to oppose those that are ablest to *distress* himself, to grow careless of *Religion*, to nourish *Factions*, to *innovate* in those Matters that the *Subjects* have most at Heart to preserve inviolable, to persuade him to dispose of the most considerable *Posts* to those that will be *false* to him, or to those that *bate* him secretly; to make him provoke his *Neighbours*, break with his *Allies*, and *prevaricate* with those at a greater Distance. Lastly, our *Adventurer* endeavours the Ruin of his *Adversaries*, destroys the *Princes* of the Blood by degrees, and puts his *Master* upon doing

doing all those Things which are most likely to bring him home the amplest Returns of *Contempt* and *Hatred*.

* SEJANUS took Care that *Tiberius* should be perpetually drench'd in the most execrable Pleasures, persuaded him to retire to *Capreae*, made him differ with Men of *Courage* and *Fidelity*, fed him with a thousand *Jealousies*, render'd him hateful to his *Subjects*, and cruel to his own *Family*; he murder'd *Drusus*, attempted the Life of *Germanicus*, and in short the whole Royal Line.

THE last *Stage* that *he* has to perform, who has past all the former, and intends to usurp the *Throne*, is to corrupt the most intimate Friends of the *Prince*, to steal the Hearts of Men of Consequence, levy what Numbers of *Partizans* he can, corrupt the Ignorant with false Reasoning (as they are the likeliest to be won that way) and the *Turbulent*, as they are most

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

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studious of *Novelty*: This was * *Otho's* Practice when he conspir'd against *Galba*. Besides, he must try to debilitate the Courage of the *Soldiers* that he finds true to their *Prince*: (these were † *Cecinna's* Artifices when he had resolv'd to betray *Vitellius*) *Sejanus* promises Pardon to all *Criminals*, Riches both to the *Nobility* and *Necessitous*, and *Revenge* to the Injur'd; he incited those that were disaffected to the *Prince*, defam'd him secretly, threw out *Complaints* against him, loaded him with universal *Hatred*, furnish'd others with Reasons for *despising* him, let his Forces and Garrisons be slenderly provided, held Intelligence with his *Rivals* in Power, combin'd with those that were his *Enemies*, made a secret, lasting Friendship and Alliance with them; secur'd the Affections of the bordering and neighbouring Powers, and kept up a good Correspondence with the strongest of them; set on foot Conspiracies against him; and

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

† Idem lib. 3.

acted lastly, under the fair and specious Pretences of *Liberty*, *publick Good*, and the like. And indeed, no one has ever yet appear'd to *usurp* the Supreme Power, or to *enslave* others, that has not made the best Use he could of such like *Pretences*: Nor was any *Roman* Emperor ever attempted to be depos'd, till the * *Usurper* first cry'd, *Liberty*, *Liberty*, and then put his Designs in Execution with the first fair Opportunity that offer'd.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 6.





C H A P. IX.

Concerning the Opportunities that make way for Changes and Revolutions.



OPPORTUNITY is a Matter of so great Moment in Revolutions, that without it there is no attempting *one*; or if it should be hazarded, it could not be brought about without the greatest Difficulty; for Opportunity gives the Ambitious a Relish for *Novelty*, points out the Way to *Usurpation*, and facilitates the rash and arduous Enterprize. Though many *Opportunities* may be thought proper for carrying on a Design of that Importance, the principal Ones are, when there are popular *Insurrections*, when *Armies* are new modell'd, when *Places* of the greatest Consequence are continu'd long in the same *Person*, when *Kingdoms* are transferr'd from one *Line* to another which
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does not claim by *Hereditary Right*, when they are influenc'd by Principles of false *Religion*, when under a Prince in Minority, when *Factions* prevail among the *Grandees*, or when Secrets of State are disclos'd, when the Prince is absent, and when foreign Assistance is at hand.

THE Rising of the *Multitude* creates a great *Opportunity* for Change, because, when they are once in Arms, they lose their natural Respect and Reverence, the *Prince* is neither obey'd or acknowledg'd; it runs like a headstrong Horse to the Precipice of *Rebellion*, which affords an excellent Handle to any designing *Usurper* to become their *Head*, and he will be obey'd and follow'd by them, in Opposition to their natural *Lord*, during the first *Impetus*; especially if the *Multitude* has committed any Crime that merits a severe Chastisement. When the People of *Genoa* rose in Arms, they chose * *Paolo Novi* Doge of the Re-

* Guicciard. lib. 7.

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publick, and flew out into open Rebellion against the *French*.

NEW modelling of *Armies* makes another powerful Opportunity, as they are a *Multitude* already arm'd and disciplin'd, and so much the more dangerous under an *Elective* King, or one destitute of a certain *Successor*, or where the *Soldiers* are vicious, insolent, and corrupt; because they thirst more after *Innovations* than any other *Species* of Men, are greedy, rapacious, and the readiest to attempt any thing in the way of *Change*, out of *Hopes* of *Gain*. * *Galba's* Army, intimidated by the new Regulations made in it, and already become vicious, insolent, and corrupted, during *Nero's* Administration, pav'd the Way for *Otho's* Usurpation.

A LONG Enjoyment of great *Posts* affords another proper *Opportunity*, not only in Kingdoms, but under any Form of Government, because when Men have

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

been accustom'd long to command, they can hardly prevail on themselves to lead a private Life again, if they are ambitious and disaffected, which makes them play all their *Artifices* to continue themselves in *Power*, and enjoy it independently of all others; this is the more easily obtain'd, by their being enabled thro' long Possession to gain the Hearts of the Soldiers and Subjects, and bewitch them so far as to forget their natural *Prince*, and both acknowledge and obey an *Usurper* in any thing. So 'tis evident, that after *Sylla* and *Marius* found Soldiers to engage with them against the *Republick*, and that *Cæsar* had actually possess'd himself of the Imperial Dignity, the *Romans* made severe Laws (had they been but observ'd) to obviate this *Inconvenience*, which they had Reason to do, considering the vast Opportunity that *long Possession* affords; and even *Cæsar*, who had reap'd the Benefit of *Possession*, made rigorous Laws against it during his *Tyranny*; for such a Command ought to be but of *short Continuance*, especially when the Government of
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the *Militia* is annex'd to it, and the Province is at a great Distance from the Place of the Prince's Residence, or the Subjects inur'd to War, and lately conquer'd.

THE Translation of a Kingdom from one *Line* to another which does not succeed by Right of Inheritance, affords another excellent *Opportunity*; because Subjects accusom'd to obey a particular *Line* of *Princes*, can hardly persuade themselves to transfer their *Allegiance* to a new one: And if there be any ambitious Subjects in that Kingdom capable of great Designs, they may put them in Motion with great Facility; especially if the State was chang'd from *Hereditary* to *Elective*, or if the new *Prince* is the Native of a hated and haughty *Nation*, or happens to be rigorous and *avaritious*, and employs wicked and rapacious *Ministers*. This is evident from the Progress and Character of * *Otho*, who built his Hopes of Success in his *Usur-*

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

pation, on his arguing after this manner; He saw the Line of the *Cæsars* extinct by the Death of *Nero*, the Empire become *Elective* by the Advancement of *Galba*, the *Army* become disaffected by the rigorous Courses he had taken with them, and his Person render'd universally odious by the Exactions and Rapaciousness of his *Ministers*.

FALSE *Religion* creeping into a *State* gives another main Opportunity; for as it infects the Vitals of Government, the *Subjects* are disunited, their Obedience is render'd precarious, and they are dispos'd to obey no one but their new *Apostle*; it begets Conspiracies, Riots, and Cabals, Things fatal to any Form of Government, but especially to *Monarchy*. When the Preacher and his Abettors have Authority and a large Retinue, they soon find noble Opportunities for imprinting their * *Notions* on the *Multitude*, as well as a specious Pretence for circumventing

* Dion. Hist. lib. 52.

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both *Prince* and *State*; especially when they are well arm'd, when the new *Religion* is suited to the Capacities and Disaffection of the Subjects, when 'tis supported by neighbouring *Princes*, and becomes their Interest to do so; and especially if it has already taken Root in the *State*.

THE *Minority* or *Incapacity* of a Prince creates another proper Opportunity, because the Desire that every one has for ruling the Roast engenders *Factions*. We have a clear Instance of this in the Kingdom of *France* during the Time of * *Charles VIII.* when the Dukes of *Bourbon* and *Orleans* contended for the Regency. The Facility of the Undertaking is apt to suggest the Thoughts of usurping the *Throne* to the Regent, or to those that are possess'd of the *principal Posts*; as it was in the Case of the Son of † *Alexander the Great*, *Antiochus*, *Scanderbeg*, and *John Galeazzo*, Duke

* Argent. de bell. Neap. lib. 1.

† Diod. Hist. lib. 1.

of *Milan*, * who were all govern'd by Uncles, Regents and *Foreigners* that overturn'd the State. This seldom fails when the *Regent* is a Prince of the Blood, or when the Regency has been of long Duration, when he is generally belov'd, and is enter'd into *Alliances* with the neighbouring Princes.

FACTIONS reigning amongst the Men of Wealth and Power furnish great Opportunities of Change; for disaffected † *Subjects* have never such a Scope for plotting as then: This is plain from the *Factions* of *Thrasylus*, and of the Friends and Relations of the Son of *Gelo*, who pav'd the Way for others to contrive how to expel them all. Besides, they fill the Kingdom with Discord and *Civil War*, as the *Factionous* did ‡ *Genoa* formerly, when it was subject to *Lewis X.* King of *France*; they weaken the *State* so, that it becomes a cheap Purchase to its

* Guicciard. lib. 7.

† Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

‡ Guicciard. lib. 1.

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Enemies, as the *Roman Empire* had like to have become a Prey to the barbarous Nations, while the two Factions of *Vitellius* and *Vespasian* contended for it. The Leaders of these factious Parties are always innovating and endeavouring to clip the *Prerogative*, for fear of being ruin'd by it; this appears by the History of the factious Leaders of the * *Cherusci*, who rebell'd against their King *Italus*, under the Pretence of curbing his growing Power. Lastly, *Factions* are apt to call in foreign Assistance when all other Efforts have prov'd successless, whereof we have a remarkable Instance in the Factions of the two Families of † *Orleans* and *Burgundy*, who ruin'd *France* by their Differences, and the Duke of *Burgundy's* calling in the *English* to his Assistance.

FOR these Reasons all wise Princes have ever endeavour'd to root them out of the State, by extinguishing the

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 11.

† Argent. lib. 10.

very *Memory* of them, and uniting their *Subjects* in Friendship and Concord: So * *Numa Pompilius* banish'd the *Distinctions* of *Romans* and *Sabines* from *Rome*; or, that any one should say, he came in with *Romulus* or with *Tatius*: And *Mecænas* advis'd *Augustus* not to tolerate those vain † *cant Names*, that particular Men or Factions distinguish'd themselves by; nor any other *Mark* that tended to the nourishing of Discord among *Subjects*; especially if these *Distinctions* chance to break out among the ‡ *Royal Family*, and *Princes* of the *Blood*; when they are like to spread, or when they appear under a *Prince* lately come to the *Crown*.

PUBLISHING of || *Secrets of State* gives another Opportunity to *Usurpers*, because whenever this happens, it must of Necessity lay open either the *Pusillanimity* or the *Weakness* of the *Prince*,

* *Plut. in Numa.*

† *Dion. lib. 52.*

‡ *Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.*

|| *Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.*

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or the *Discontentedness* and *Strength* of the Subjects, or something parallel that promises both Facility and Security, if an *Usurper* tries his Fortune.

DESIRE of *Power* is natural to all Men; and when once they conceive Hopes of Success, they quickly go to work in earnest. When Men become sensible that Things which appear'd vastly difficult, and which they durst hardly think of, much less attempt, are both easy and void of Danger, they are soon put in Execution; and tho' the first Essay should not succeed, yet the Example remains and proves an Encouragement to the next Adventurers, and shews them the Reason why the former Attempt miscarry'd.

TIBERIUS bore with the insolent Letter of *Lentulus Getulicus*, which inform'd him that *he should look upon a Successor as the Forerunner of his Death; and that the Emperor and he should make this Agreement, that he should*

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keep his Province, and the Prince remain in quiet Possession of all the rest, provided he was not remov'd: And tho' Tiberius was the haughtiest Prince in the World, he never thought fit to attempt it, because he was sensible how far he was advanc'd in Years, that his Empire subsisted rather by *Reputation* than *Force*, therefore he would not run the Risque of reducing *Getulicus* by the Sword, for fear of discovering the *Secret*, and leaving it on Record to Governors of Provinces, that they might maintain themselves in their Commands in spite of the Emperors. Nothing hurt the Roman Empire more than the divulging of that principal *Secret*, that the Emperors might be chosen any where as well as at *Rome*; so many were the *Changes* that ensu'd, when the *Armies* came once to see plainly, that it lay entirely in their Breasts whom they would prefer to the Empire.

IT was the Opinion of a prudent Senator, that the *Roman Slaves* should not be distinguish'd by their Cloaths from

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from the *Freemen*, lest when they came to consider their *Numbers*, they should know their *Power*, and practise against the Government for that very Reason.

THE Distance of the *Prince* affords another Opportunity to Innovators; ambitious Spirits, and they that are studious of *Change*, are always upon the Watch; bad Humours closely pent up, are apt to break out during this *Interim*, Persons disaffected to the Government appear more bold, they that have been aggriev'd muster up Partizans and Followers with greater Facility, the Motions of suspected Persons are neglected, nor are the Beginnings of Commotions so easily allay'd; especially when the Power of the *Prince* is not well establish'd, or he is generally *bated*, or has tributary Princes to contend with. *Tiberius* refus'd, for this Reason, to go in *Person* against the * *German* Legions that

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 1.

had mutiny'd, tho' he had all the Inducements to it, and was blam'd for not doing of it, because he did not think it expedient to leave the *Capital* of the Empire, and expose himself to so much Hazard. When a Prince is oblig'd to be absent from his *State* for some Time, he now and then carries the Persons of greatest Note and Consequence along with him as *Hostages*, as * *Vitiges* King of the *Goths* did, when he left *Rome* to go to *Ravenna*; or sometimes takes those with him that he distrusts most, as † *Gadatas* did, when he accompany'd *Cyrus* to *Babylon*; or when these that are suspected are order'd to go on any Pretence another Way, as ‡ *Augustus* sent great Numbers of Senators and Knights to *Greece*, when he went to engage *Mark Anthony*.

* Procop. lib. 1.

† Zeno. Cyrop. lib. 5.

‡ Dion. lib. 50.

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THE Approach of a *foreign Army* creates another Opportunity; for Assistance at hand makes the Prince's Enemies pull off the Mask, elevates the Ambitious, encourages the Injur'd, stimulates those that are desirous of Novelty, hardens Criminals, awakens the Oppress'd, fills Pretenders with Hopes, incites the Irresolute, and provokes those that are previously dispos'd for *Change*. The March of a foreign Army lends Wings to the Ambition of potent and daring Subjects, adds Fuel to the Hatred and Rage of the oppress'd, and gives the general Alarm to Insurrection. The History of the *Boij* affords us an Instance to this Purpose, who rose in Arms against the *Romans* as soon as *Hannibal* appear'd in *Italy*. What **Tiberius* labour'd most was, to remove the War as far from him as he could, and to sow the Seeds of *Discord* and *Sedition* among People of a Warlike *Genius*. Certain it is, that the Approach of a *foreign Army*

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

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furnishes the greatest Opportunity then, when the Prince is universally *hated*, sits but loosely on his *Throne*, or is at a great Distance from it, when he has lost a *Battle*, or when his Enemy pretends to the *Crown*, or has *Adherents* in the Kingdom, and is in a flourishing Condition.



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CHAP. X.

Why one Kingdom is more subject to Change than another.



HE Monarchy is more dispos'd to Revolution than another, on account of the Condition and Circumstances of the Prince, of the Subjects, the Administration, and the State itself.

AMONGST other the Circumstances of the Prince, the most considerable are, when he is the first *de facto* King of his Family, lately advanc'd to that Dignity, destitute of Troops, regardless of Religion, tamely subjected to others, cruel, perpetually given to his Pleasures, a Destroyer of the Laws, Privileges, and fundamental Maxims, bent on levying exorbitant Taxes, a Corrupter of Female Honour, one that invades other Mens Properties, who undervalues and despises his Subjects,

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Old and Childless, who has none to succeed, nor Allies to support him, at Variance with his Neighbours, educated where both the Laws and Customs are repugnant to those of the Country he reigns over; for as he is the first of his Family, he cannot be settled in the Government, which makes it easier to compass a Change. For this Reason Cæsar took Care to obviate what Tumults might happen to the Prejudice of * Cleopatra and her Brother in Egypt in the Beginning of their Reign, in hopes that Time would fix them in the Throne.

A PRINCE'S Weakness ruins the Authority that he ought to have over his Subjects; Want of Religion deprives him of their Love and Respect; and Meanness and Imprudence render him contemptible, as it did the Emperor Claudius. A Life continually addicted to dishonest Pleasures, exposes him to Contempt as well as to be easily at-

* Hirt. bell. Alex.

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tack'd, as it did * *Sardanapalus* and *Dionysius*, the first of them slain by *Arbaces*, and the other by *Dion*. Cruelty, overturning of *Laws*, *Privileges*, and *fundamental Maxims*, and exorbitant *Taxes*, create him universal *Hatred*; and *vitiating Women*, violating *Property*, and neglecting the *Subjects*, beget insuperable *Resentment*; as 'tis plain from the Instance of † *Tarquinius Superbus*. ‡ *Age*, *Want of Children*, *Successors*, and *Alliances*, are apt to excite People to try their Fortunes; for which Reason *Augustus* made *Tiberius* adopt *Germanicus*, tho' he had a Son of his own; and *Galba* adopted *Piso*.

|| *HIERONYMUS*, the Grandchild of *Hiero*, lost his Kingdom and Life chiefly for his having departed from the Friendship and Confederacy of the *Romans*; so that an ill Understanding

* Arift. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

† Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

‡ Idem Hist. lib. 1.

|| Liv. lib. 4.

with

with the neighbouring Powers foments the Disaffection of the Subjects, and stimulates the Ambitious and Discontented, by suggesting Hopes of Protection and Assistance. Vannius King of the Suevi furnishes us with a Proof of this, who was expell'd his Kingdom by his Subjects, assisted by his Neighbours, with whom he had neglected to keep up a good Correspondence. Wherefore 'tis a Matter of greater Advantage to a Prince, as well in enlarging as preserving his Kingdom (according to *Isocrates* in his Letter to *Philip* of *Macedon*) and keeping his Subjects in Order, to cultivate Harmony in the Neighbourhood, than it is to have a numerous Standing Army in Pay. And the Prince's being a Stranger both to the Laws and Customs of the Country he governs, mightily encourages all Innovators; * *Vonones* was expell'd *Parthia* on this Account.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

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WHEN the *Dispositions* of the *Prince* and *State*, the *Times*, and the *bordering Princes* chance to differ; if there be *Subjects* of great *Abilities* in that *State*, and the *Prince* be a *Person* of mean *Intellects*, and less *Courage*; if 'tis a *Kingdom* new erected by its *Valour*, and the *Prince* is weak and ill-belov'd by the *Army*; if it labours under *Misfortunes*, and the *Prince* is negligent and ignorant: if the *Juncture* requires *Promptitude* and *Resolution*, and the *Prince* is *irresolute* and *trifling* in every respect; and if all the *Actions* and *Inclinations* of the neighbouring *Powers* are entirely directed to *Artifices* proper to bring about a *Revolution*, and the *Prince* either wants *Sagacity* sufficient, or neglects his *Indications*, and delays to purge his *Kingdom* from such *Correspondence*, the more dangerous his *Condition* is. Or, if he withdraws his *Confidence* from his faithful *Friends*, and unites with those whom he ought to *mistrust*, or actually trusts those that he has *injur'd* and *aggriev'd*, or discovers

vers an *Uneasiness of Temper*, and Designs portending *Danger* to particular *Persons*, and is altogether bent on *innovating*. Or, when he removes the *Ministers* employ'd by his *Predecessor* without assigning any plausible Reason for it, and strips the *Grandees* of the *State* of their *Pensions*, then he is in a dangerous Condition. *Lewis XI.* of *France* found this experimentally true; but when he found his Error, he advis'd his Son * *Charles*, towards the End of his Life, never to be guilty of it.

OR, when a *Prince* is *indolent*, and slips the Opportunity of nipping Com-motions in the Bud: This is manifest from the ill Conduct of the Emperor † *Adrian*, who was forc'd to wage a regular War with the *Jews*, for having despis'd them at first; and for this very Reason ‡ *Tiberius* dispatch'd *Stajus* the Tribune with a good Detachment

* Phil. de Comin. lib. 9.

† Dion. in Adrian.

‡ Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

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against the Slaves that had rebell'd; and 'tis plain, that * *Suetonius Paulinus* quell'd the Rebellion of the *Brittons* by his Expedition.

OR, if the Prince is involv'd in a difficult and dangerous War; for in such a Conjunction Subjects are aptest to declare for *Change*: So the † *Tus-cans* rebell'd against the *Romans* as soon as they saw them engag'd in a War with the *Samnites*.

BESIDES, there is Danger when the Prince is *unfortunate*, because *Subjects* are most inclin'd to withdraw their *Allegiance* from them, when they see their Enemies prosper: So the Inhabitants of ‡ *Teos*, a City in *Ionia*, open'd their Gates to the *Lacedæmonians* when they had beat the *Athenian* Fleet; and the || *Germans* made fresh Insurrections when they heard

* Tacit. in Agric.

† Liv. lib. 10.

‡ Thucyd. lib. 8.

|| Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

the News of the Loss of Germanicus's
Navy.

OR, if a Prince's *Birth* is not suitable to his Station and Dignity. And lastly, when he is come of a *Predecessor* hated and despis'd; for if he is likewise mean and contemptible, *Subjects* will not only have the Boldness to dis-esteem, but to dethrone him, being previously prepar'd for *Disobedience* and *Contempt*. But, on the other hand, if he is come of a *Predecessor* who was respected and belov'd, tho' he should prove base and good for nothing, he may preserve the suitable Dignity and Esteem, on the Strength of his Father's *Virtue* being deeply rooted in the Minds of the *People*. In like manner, if his *Successor* is likewise abhor'd, it will be difficult to prevent the Ruin of his *Kingdom*, because *Hatred* is accumulated on *Hatred* to that excessive Degree: But if, on the other side, he descends from a *Prince* universally belov'd, let himself be never so much abhor'd and hateful, he may even weather that *Storm* too,

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by the Assistance of his *Ancestor's* Goodness riveted in his *Subjects* Memory. So *Cambyses*, a Man to be abhor'd in every Respect, escap'd the Hatred of his *Subjects* on account of the vast Opinion they had conceiv'd of the Worth of his Father *Cyrus*: The same Thing happen'd to the Emperor *Commodus*, tho' he had not one Virtue to recommend him; because his Father *Aurelius* had fix'd his Empire in his People's Hearts.

THE *Circumstances* and *Conditions* of *Subjects*, that principally render a Kingdom subject to *Change*, are first, when *Monarchy* is not agreeable to their Temper; for every * *Species* of Government requires different *Dispositions* of Mind to establish it: Hence, when *Subjects* are not naturally inclin'd to *Monarchy*, especially when fierce and untameable, there's no such Thing as keeping them in Subjection, because they will be always averse both to the Name and Government

* Aristot. Pol. lib. 3. cap. ult.

of a King. The Nation of the *Suevi* are a plain Proof of this; who hated the Administration of their King * *Maroboduus*, and declar'd for *Arminius*, who fought for *Liberty*.

LIKE WISE when the *Prince* and *Subjects* disagree in Point of *Religion*; and then 'tis so much the worse, if that *Religion* is fraught with *Republican* Notions; for it directs all their Thoughts to the Ruin of their *Prince*.

WHEN they have an Aversion to the *Nation* from which the *Prince* is come, for in that Case they obey with great *Reluctancy*. When they hate the *Prince* or *Monarchical* Government, by reason of ill Usage receiv'd from him or his *Predecessors*; because it fixes their Thoughts continually on freeing themselves from *Servitude*, as it did the *Romans* under *Tarquin*.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

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WHEN they are *untractable*, *turbulent*, and addicted to *War*; for such as these obey with an ill Grace, and are always ready to throw off the *Yoke*; for which Reason * *Julus Agricola* try'd all possible Means to soften and correct that Fierceness in the *Britons*. Besides, when they are arriv'd to great *Strength* and *Power*, and any *Subject* exceeds the rest to an eminent Degree; † for as those that are most over-grown with *Power* are generally at the *Bottom* of all *Troubles* and *Seditions*, so they transform themselves into *Leaders*, and are seldom ever afterwards content to live a private Life.

WHEN they are excessive ‡ *poor*, and naturally *turbulent*; for *Poverty* makes Men apt to take *Arms*, and *Turbulence* of Spirit disposes them to *Change*; as it did the People of

* Tacit. in Agric.

† Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 11.

‡ Thucyd. lib. 1.

Africa, who rebell'd with * *Tacferinas* against the Emperor *Tiberius*.

WHEN they are naturally wavering and *inconstant*; for in that Case they relish nothing but *Novelty*. When they have been convey'd over to a *Prince* by way of *Dower*; for then they have neither *Inclination* nor *Affection* for him.

WHEN a *Prince* is *King* of more *Nations* than one, and the principal *One* happens to rebel, because it is the true *Source* of the *Strength* he is *Master* of, and the only *Curb* for the rest of his *Subjects*, that he can depend on.

WHEN the *Leaders* are come of *Families* belov'd by the *People*; they are so much the more to be dreaded, if they have a large *Vassallage*, and are reckon'd *Defenders* of the *Common Good*.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

WHEN they are in actual Possession of Fortresses, Principalities, Places, great Hereditary Offices, by which they are enabled to assist those who have lately had the Misfortune to lose their *Liberty*; which was the Case of the * *German Nations* under the Command of *Quintilius Varus*: Or, when a Nation has voluntarily resign'd their *Freedom* into the Hands of a *King*; because they may resolve to re-instate themselves in their *Liberties* with the same Facility that they gave them up, which † *Pyrrhus* experienc'd in *Sicily*, for his cruel Treatment of the principal *Syracusians*; and *Belisarius*, ‡ in his Letter to *Justinian* concerning the *Romans*, advises him, *That their Obedience was the Effect of Fear, and not of Love*; which was likewise the Case of the || *Parthians*, when they rebell'd against *Artabanus*.

* Dion. lib. 56.

† Plut. in *Pyrrh.*

‡ Procop. lib. 1.

|| Tacit. *Annal.* lib. 6.

AND

AND when *Subjects* yield Obedience merely through *Compulsion*, as * *Jason* the *Thessalian* said in a Conversation with *Polydamas* of *Pharsalia*. When they languish under extravagant *Impositions* and *Taxes*, or are harrass'd with other intolerable *Oppressions*; for in this Case *Subjects* are apt to take Advice from *Despair*, as the † *Frysii* actually did when they rebell'd against *Tiberius*.

WHEN they are exasperated by being engag'd in perpetual *Wars*; for which Reason *Numa Pompilius* took all the Opportunities he could find, to sweeten the Temper of the ‡ *Romans*, by accustoming them to live in Peace.

WHEN they are firmly persuaded, that they may shake off the Yoke of *Servitude* by changing their *Master*,

* Xenoph. Græc. Hist. lib. 6.

† Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

‡ Liv. lib. 1.

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and that the *Prince* is distrustful, and always suspects their *Fidelity*.

WHEN the *Prince* distributes his Favours so partially, that he shews he esteems one Part of his Subjects more than another, and confers all his Graces on them; this is plain from the Example of some Cities of * *Gaul*, who acted vigorously against *Galba* for being more disregarded, or worse us'd than other Cities by him: And when *Tiberius* was about to go in Person to see his two † *Armies* that had mutiny'd, he stopp'd to consider, among other Things, whether he did not run the Risque of being hated, and giving Occasion to a fresh Mutiny, by visiting one Army before another.

‡ AND when any Subject grows supercilious on his having acquir'd great Reputation by his good Behaviour in the Army.

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

† Idem Annal. lib. 1.

‡ Arist. Pol. lib. 1. cap. 10.

WHEN

WHEN Subjects can neither live in *Servitude*, nor be content with *Liberty*; for then 'tis difficult to drive so even between the *two*, as to please them; as * *Galba* told *Piso* when he adopted him, speaking of the *Romans*.

WHEN they have but very lately lost their *Liberty*, and are yet unus'd to *Slavery*; like the † *Trinobantes* and other *Britons*, who rebell'd in the Time of the Emperor *Nero*.

WHEN they are *Men* of that *Figure*, that the Eyes and Inclinations of all their Fellow Subjects are turn'd on them; when they are related to powerful and absolute *Princes*: when they hold Correspondence with the Rivals and *Enemies* of their *Prince*: when they are *Pretenders* to the *Crown*: when they reckon themselves able enough to cope with the *Prince* against whom they rise in Rebellion; for no

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

† Idem Annal. lib. 14.

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Nation or City ever aim'd at a Change of *Government*, who did not think they were strong enough of *themselves*, or together with their *Confederates*, or in Conjunction with those into whose *Arms* they threw themselves for *Protection*, to defend them from him against whom they rebell'd; as *Diodotus* the *Athenian* said in a Speech that he made for the *Mitylenians*.

AND lastly, when they are us'd to rebel, or have escap'd with Impunity after so doing; for Men easily repeat the same Fault when they are convinc'd that the *Prince* hates them, and that he continues to suspect all their Actions; so that when once they get the better of the Dread of *Punishment* (the sole Motive that restrains those who are deficient in Point of *Loyalty*) they grow more haughty, and act more boldly against the *Prince*; for which Reason the * *Romans* determin'd to go to War with the *Vejentes* in order to chastise them.

* Liv. lib. 8.

AMONG the other *Qualities* of an *Administration* which render it mutable, the most remarkable are, when it becomes *violent, cruel, and inexorable*: when it suffers the Populace to affront with Impunity, and supports the *Great and Powerful* in wronging the *Commons*: when it grants greater *Liberty* than *Subjects* ought to enjoy, or treats them like *Slaves*: * when 'tis not adapted to *their* Temper, by indulging those *Subjects* that ought to be govern'd with a strait Rein; as it appears by the Administration of † *Vectius Bolanus*, Governor of *Britain*: Or on the contrary, when it is unseasonably *severe* to those that ought to be treated with *Lenity*, like the ‡ *Carthaginians* when they were Masters of *Spain*: when it would oblige *Subjects* untam'd and unaccustom'd to obey, to the Performance of what they are utter *Strangers* to; for which Reason the *Thracians*

* Plut. in Publicol.

† Tacit. in Agricol.

‡ Polyb. lib. 10.

rebell'd

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rebell'd against the Emperor * *Tiberius*: when it would tie them down to a more strict manner of Life; when it loads *Subjects* with grievous *Burdens*, that have scarcely learnt to wear their *Chains* with Decency; as † *Quintilius Varus* did the *Germans*: when it trusts too much to the *Patience* of their *Subjects*, without ever considering whether they are incapable of revenging themselves, or whether they are become *desperate*, and yet still proceed to *exasperate* them without Fear or Wit: when it steers by *Rules* and *Maxims* different from those on which the *State* was founded: when it is superannuated; for *Bodies Politick* have their *Periods* as well as *Bodies Natural*: when it neglects growing Disorders that tend immediately to corrupt the *Vitals* of the *State*: when it does not remove turbulent, innovating, and restless *Spirits*: when it neglects to disarm a fierce, powerful, conquer'd People, and garrison their Towns to

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

† Dion. lib. 56.

keep them in Awe; as * *Cyrus* did in the Province of *Babylon*, or to curb them with Fortresses situated in convenient Places, as † he did by erecting them upon the Mountains of *Chaldea*, to be a Terror to the *Armenians* and *Chaldeans*: when it endeavours to keep its Subjects in continual *Dread*: when it attempts to introduce Things contrary to the general Sense of the Nation, or even had in the utmost *Aversion*: when it has render'd itself entirely *odious* to those who enjoy most Power: when it does not find out proper *Diversions* to exercise the Ambition of the *Powerful* and the *Bold*, and neglects to remove disaffected Persons capable of overturning the *Government*, under Pretence of doing them Honour: when it suffers any one discontented *Subject* to grow too powerful, and does not use proper Means to lessen his Power gradually after he is arriv'd at that Pitch, but is too *precipitate* in the Execution: when it proposes no other

* Xen. *Cyrop.* lib. 7.

† Idem lib. 3.

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Scope but the *Profit* and *Pleasure* of the *Prince* and his *Favourites*.

AND Lastly, when it disposes of all * *Preferments* to haughty and *audacious* Men; because such as these are fit to attempt any thing: or to *avaritious* and *insolent* Men; because they despise the *Subjects*, and force them to *rebel* thro' ill Usage: or to those that are not *Natives*, or of a Nation *hated* by the *Subjects*; because the *Ill-Usage* they meet with from them, reduces them to *Despair*: or to such as are secretly *Enemies*, and have been *injur'd* by the *Prince*; because they create *Opportunities* for revenging themselves: or to those that are *violent* and *inconsiderate*, because they *precipitate* every thing.

AND when all *Places* of *Figure* are vested in *one Subject* only; because the *Majesty* of the *Prince* is † *eclips'd* and *debas'd* by such extravagant Power and

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 11.

† Arist. Pol. ibid.

Authority's being lodg'd with *one* ; and if he is treacherous and ambitious, he may easily usurp the Throne ; or if all *Preferments* center in a certain Number straitly joyn'd by the Tyes of *Friendship* and *Relation* ; for when they prove *false* and *faithless*, they may agree to bring about a *Revolution*.

THE Qualities of the *State* itself, that are most likely to produce a *Change* of *Government*, are, when it has gone out of one *Family* into another, because Subjects us'd to live under a certain *Race* of *Princes*, are hardly brought to serve a new one. The having lately alter'd from *Hereditary* to *Elective*, or *vice versa* ; because it paves the Way to great *Changes*, as appears by * *Otho's* Conduct. *Changing* its *Kings* often ; for it animates the *People* to *Licentiousness*, as 'tis plain from the History of the *Roman* Empire. When the *State* is but *small* ; for whoever attempts to usurp it, does it with great

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1. cap. 2.

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Ease, and little Danger of being frustrated. Want of *Laws* to restrain exorbitant *Power*; because it quickly degenerates into *Tyranny*, which produces *Change*: for which Cause *Theopompus*, King of *Lacedæmon*, created the Magistrates call'd *Ephori*, to bridle *absolute Power*. Having been subject to divers *Masters*; because that leaves the Impressions of different *Inclinations*, repugnant to sincere *Obedience*, which all appear on different Occasions and facilitate a *Change*: This we discover from the Conduct of the *Armenians* with regard to the *Race* of the * *Ar-jacidae*, tho' *Tigranes* was put into Possession of the Crown by *Nero*. The Kingdom's being infected with *Sectaries*; for then 'tis divided against itself. When the † *Prince* who is expell'd lives, or his Heirs, either within the State, or near it; because they will be still contriving to re-possess themselves: for which *Reason*, when *Artabanus* had driven *Vonones* out of *Parthia*, he would

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

† Guicciard. lib. 2.

not suffer him to be made King of *Armenia*; and * *Vologeses* King of *Parthia* requested *Germanicus*, not to suffer *Vonones* to remain in *Syria*. The Prince's having many near *Relations* in the Kingdom that are not provided for according to their *Quality*; because this will suggest Matter of continual Discord, which divides the Power and Affections of the Family, and ruins the Kingdom: therefore the foremention'd *Vologeses* made his Brothers † *Pacorus* and *Tiridates* Kings. Where the Prince is expos'd to the various *Demands* of other Kings; ‡ because the *Subjects* are in that Case irritated by *Pretenders* to attempt a *Change*. Where Assistance is easily had; for then *Subjects* are sooner prevail'd on to venture their *Fortunes*. When *Dominions* are vastly extended; for 'tis with great Difficulty that they are kept under good Government: Therefore || *Au-*

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

† Idem lib. 15.

‡ Liv. lib. 4.

|| Tacit. Annal. lib. 1.

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gustus left this Piece of Advice, among others, to his Successors, *to contract the Limits of the Empire*. Where *Corruption* predominates in a State; because the *sound Part* is quickly *infected*, and a Change must follow. * Abundance of needy *Nobility*; for they are the properest Tools to *innovate* with. Inveterate *Parties* among the Great Men, especially if any one of them be of the *Royal Family*; because they weaken it, depriv e it of due Respect, and effectually put an End to all Order. When a State harbours the Offspring of *Rebels*; because they are inclin'd to tread in the Footsteps of their *Ancestors*. Where there are many *Exiles* and Criminals; because Men of that Stamp are very studious of *Novelty*. Where Communication with † *Foreigners* is always open, whereof great Numbers of all Ranks are admitted to reside in the *Kingdom*; for they of all Men are most dispos'd to Tumult and Insurre-

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

† Idem lib. 5. cap. 3.

ctions. When 'tis full of * Forts and fortify'd Places; for then the Restless and Seditious never want a Place of Strength to retire to. Being surrounded by powerful Neighbours, tho' they are neither naturally or accidentally *Enemies* to the *State*; because the Hopes of Assistance are apt to suggest Thoughts of *Change*, and the Enjoyment of *Liberty*: as *Isocrates* said in his second Letter to *Philip* of *Macedon*, and is plain from the Situation of the † *Armenians* between the *Romans* and *Parthians*. Where a *State* has deviated far from its *first Principles*; because it loses that Perfection that should have kept it in Being, and admits of *Qualities* contradictory to the *Essence* of *Monarchy*. Having Laws and Customs that tend to favour a *Republick*; because that Form of Government is then easily introduc'd. When one Part of a *Prince's* Dominions is at a great Distance from the Place of his

* Argent. in Lew. X.

† Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

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Residence; because Subjects grow bolder for that Reason, and are also commonly worse us'd by *Ministers*, whence they are sometimes driven to the very Brink of *Despair*.

'Tis a known Truth, that the distant Parts of a *Prince's Dominions* enjoy few or none of his *Favours*, compar'd with those that are under his Eye: They are not cherish'd with his Presence, nor have they any Share in the continual *Graces* flowing from the Goodness of their *Sovereign*; yet on all Occasions they are equally loaded. Their *Support* under Affliction is but *slender*, their *Grievances* are slowly redress'd, nor are their *Petitions* always heard; and 'tis certain likewise, that tho' they neither participate, nor indeed taste of his *Indulgence* in any considerable Degree, they are nevertheless ready to assist him with their *Fortunes*, and risque their *Lives* for him on any Occasion. 'Tis likewise true, that whatever Alterations happen in *remote Provinces* are most easily remedy'd, when they are taken in Time, because

because they generally proceed from the *Perfidy* of *Ministers*: But for those that are directly aim'd at the Person of the *Prince*, the *State* seldom gets clear of them, or recovers its ancient Tranquillity.

THAT distant Part of the State is most dispos'd to *Change*, which has been acquir'd by Conquest, and is best peopled; and this will happen the rather, if to those *Qualifications* there are superadded an Inclination to *Arms*, powerful Vassals, and Subjects of extraordinary Abilities. When it has been united a considerable Time to the preponderating *State*, by a Community of *Customs* and Laws, by continual *Intercourse*, by mild *Treatment*, by *Intermarriages*, by Enjoyment of the same *Privileges* with the predominant *Nation*; it coalesces into one *State* with the other, or they may be said rather to grow one Body by Virtue of the strong Tyes of *Love* and *Intercourse*. This is the Way to cultivate Friendship with *Foreigners*, and

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unite *remote Provinces*; not as * *Xerxes* pretended to unite *Europe* and *Asia* by a Bridge over the *Helleſpont*, for which he is juſtly ridicul'd; but by taking the ſame Way that † *Alexander the Great* did, who, to his eternal Honour, marry'd the fair *Roxana*, and oblig'd one hundred noble *Greeks* and *Macedonians* to marry as many *Persian Ladies*, by which he joyn'd *Greece* and *Persia* much more effectually.

LASTLY, that *Monarchy* is moſt ſubject to *Change*, which keeps up a great *Standing Army*, eſpecially if the *Army* is unanimous, and have any Share in the *Election* of the *Prince*; becauſe the *ill Treatment* that the *Subjects* meet with from the *Army* is ſuch, that they are reduc'd to *Deſpair*, and 'tis with the greateſt Difficulty that the *Prince* can comply with three ſuch different Humours (I might have ſaid contrary) as thoſe of the *Commons*,

* Plut. de Fortuna.

† Idem in Alex.

the *Nobility*, and the *Army*. When the *Army* is *corrupted* by *Ease*, fair *Promises*, and *Donatives*, they are ripe for any *Insurrection*; and (if the *General* takes such *Ways*) will follow and obey him on any *Emergency* that he thinks fit to employ them, be it never so hazardous.

THE *Nobility* are dispos'd to *Conspiracies* either thro' *Fear*, *Disdain*, or *Ambition*; and when the *Commons* either become licentious, or are *oppress'd*, they are vastly given to *Change*. After the *Roman Empire* grew subject to *Revolutions*, so great was the Number of its slaughter'd *Princes*, that neither *Goodness* avail'd to secure some from *Murder*, nor could the *Bad* be brought to condign Punishment for their *Mal-Administration*; because the *latter*, wicked and profligate as they were, comply'd easily with the Temper of the *Army* and the *Times*; whereas the *Goodness* of the other was rather noxious to them, by reason of the *Corruption* that had infected the *Empire*.



C H A P. XI.

Concerning mediate and immediate Dispositions, and particularly of those that are necessary to Revolutions.



TO create a *Change* in a *Monarchy*, or any other Form of Government, *near* or *immediate Dispositions* are necessary; * for every *Subject* must be ready to receive the *Form* or *Impression* that is to be stamp'd upon it. As for *remote* or *mediate Dispositions*, they are insufficient, because no State is ever without them; (*viz.*) *Desire of Novelty*, which disposes or inclines the People to follow the aspiring Person willingly: *The Inconstancy and Volubility of the Common People*, which makes them wish for any sort of Alteration: *A Belief of rendring the Government more*

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 1.

agreeable, which inclines People to submit to a new Yoke: *The Poverty of the Subjects*, and the like, which are apt to inspire Hopes of bettering their Condition by a *Revolution*: But such *Dispositions* must also necessarily concur, after which no other are requisite to work a *Change*.

THO' many Dispositions might be consider'd under this Head, the chief of them are, *A voluntary Inclination of the whole Aggregate towards Him who attempts to seize the Crown: Being discontented with the present Government, and a Resolution of the most powerful Part of the Nation to change.* When a Change of the Form of Government is design'd, remote Dispositions are likewise necessary to concur; such as, *An universal Desire of Liberty, &c.* which makes every one hear when she calls: *A Zeal for the Common Good, &c.* which is the *State Principle of Unity*: But immediate Dispositions are necessary also, that is, *A Dislike of Monarchy, and Customs incompatible with it.*

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SUCH an Inclination of the *Subjects* to any one Person as we have describ'd, is an *immediate Disposition*; for all submit voluntarily to his Government, to whom they are inclin'd by *Will*; they reckon him worthiest to command, they favour and assist him chearfully, and very easily inlist in his Party, and become his Followers: This is confirm'd by the Example of * *Vespasian*, who became Emperor by having all Mens Hearts fix'd on him. This *Inclination* proceeds chiefly from *one Subject's* exceeding the rest in *Power*, and by carrying himself so artfully as to captivate all Mens Affections; for as *his* Power surpasses every one's, so every Action of *his* is proportionably more conspicuous to all; and as *he* is the Person who, upon Occasion, can protect and defend the Injur'd and Oppress'd, and become the Mediator between the *Prince* and his Subjects, or between him and particular Men, or that can even oppose his *Prince*, he

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 2.

soon turns all Mens Eyes and Inclinations to himself. Certain it is, that Men of such excessive *Power* and *Artifice* are seldom without vast ambitious *Thoughts*, and full of *Arrogance*. Hence * such an Excess of *Power* vested in the Person of any *one Subject* must be extremely dangerous to any *Kingdom*, because it is the *immediate Cause* of the immediate *Disposition*; and it must provoke a *Prince* to see the *People* place their Affections on Persons suspected for *Reasons* of *State*, because he knows that the *immediate Disposition* has already taken Root. We see how much † *Tiberius* was disgusted at the popular Favour that *Agrippina*, the Wife of *Germanicus*, enjoy'd; that ‡ *Cyaxares* was vex'd at *Cyrus's* having gain'd the Affections of the *Medes*; and || *Rubellius Plautus* was order'd to reside in *Asia* by *Nero*, for the same Reason.

* Arist. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 11.

† Tacit. Annal. lib. 3.

‡ Xenoph. Cyrop. lib. 5.

|| Tacit. Annal. lib. 14.

Hence

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HENCE it is, that the * *Greatness* of ambitious *Subjects* is an Eyefore to the *Prince*, and 'tis but Prudence in them to watch those that surpass others in so extraordinary a Manner. Princes, according to † *Aristotle*, should be ever on their Guard to hinder enterprizing, disaffected *Subjects* from multiplying Vassallages, Dependants, and Forces. When any suspected Subject is arriv'd to this Pitch, ‡ *let the Prince either raise others to the like Height in order to counter-balance his Power, or let him gradually undermine the Basis of his Ambition, or remove him to a considerable Distance from the State, under Pretence of doing him Honour.*

THE general Discontent of a Kingdom with the present Administration, is an immediate Disposition; for then *Subjects* are always dispos'd to remove it out of their Sight; and as they are

* Guic. lib. 13.

† Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 11.

‡ Idem ibid.

impatiently desirous of *Change*, they follow any one that leads up the Dance, and obey him, because in their Judgment he deserves it best. This is plain from * *Nero's Case*, whose Tyrannical Government rais'd such a vast Impatience in *Rome*, that it was the Cause of his being depos'd, and advancing *Galba* to the Empire. This *Impatience* superadds an uncommon Warmth for *Change*, to the ordinary Desire of *Novelty*; and to the Hopes of bettering the *Government*, a fix'd Opinion that the present is the *worst* that can be; it is also link'd with *Despair*, whose Effects are so pestiferous and deadly.

A RESOLUTION to *Change* made by the most powerful Part, is another immediate *Disposition*; for it not only removes the Obstacle, but, what is of greater Significancy, the Usurper reaps the Benefit of its united Power, and now and then it suggests Thoughts of

* Sueton. in Neron.

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a Revolution to him. * *Otho* found this *Resolution* in the most powerful Party (which was the Soldiery) rais'd by *Galba's* rigorous Proceedings, which not only assisted him in seizing the Empire with so much Facility, but incited him to it. This *Resolution* arms the Inconstancy of the *People* with Intrepidity in the Execution, and backs the Desire of *Novelty* with all the Power of Constancy.

'TIS no great Wonder that there are some People in every Kingdom desirous of *Change*, and that they should put on a Resolution to prosecute it; for let a *Prince* be never so upright, he may be hated by some disaffected *Subject* (and such are never wanting) as well as by those that are studious of Novelty, as † *Xenophon* said, talking of the ‡ *Eliasis*: however, these are of small Significance; but the great Danger is, when the *Party* that has al-

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

† Senec. de Provid.

‡ Xenoph. Hist. lib. 5.

ready taken the *Resolution* to change, is the strongest. 'Tis therefore the Business of every prudent Prince * to endeavour to secure the *Affection and Obedience of the powerfullest Party, in order to guard against any sudden Alteration*; † for as he has nothing to fear from a weak and feeble Enemy, so on the other hand, his Reign can be but short, if the stronger Part have already determin'd to remove him. When this happens, the Prince must endeavour to quiet them by giving up those Things to them (at least by promising to do so) which they rose up in Arms to recover: This was the Course that ‡ *Tiberius* took with the *Legions* that mutiny'd in *Germany* and *Hungary*; and 'tis manifest that *Galba* lost his Empire and Life for refusing a *pitiful Donative* to the Army. A Prince in those Circumstances should likewise try || *to remove the Cause of*

* Arist. Pol. lib. 4. cap. 12.

† Idem lib. 5. cap. 9.

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 2.

|| Idem Hist. lib. 1.

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the Resolution, or sooth and bring over the Leaders, or divert the Storm, by employing the Party in some important War.

THE *being dissatisfy'd with Monarchical Government, is another immediate Disposition* that may alter the *Form* of it; for it fixes the Thoughts of the Subjects on freeing themselves from *Servitude*, makes them ready on all Occasions to shake off the *Yoke*, and incites them to follow him with great Eagerness that fights for their *Liberty*. Thus *Rome* obey'd *Brutus* and *Collatinus*, who had appear'd with the greatest Earnestness in the Expulsion of *Tarquin*, and in laying the Foundation of the Commonwealth. This *Dissatisfaction* proceeds from a *Series* of great and reiterated *Abuses* committed by *Princes*, and an Opinion rivetted in the Minds of the *Subjects*, that their Condition can never be better'd under a Monarchical Form of Government. This *Dissatisfaction* superadds the *Springs* of *Impatience* and *Despair* to the universal Desire of *Liberty*,

berty, and as it enters deep and strikes Root in the Soul, 'tis hardly ever to be eradicated. Therefore two or three Reigns of unjust and *violent Princes* will reduce a *State* to the Verge of *Change*, and while this *Dissatisfaction* continues to influence, the least Abuse of Power on the Part of the *Prince* will, for this Reason, endanger the Loss of the Kingdom. So the *Rape* committed by young * *Tarquin* was the Cause of his Expulsion, and of the subsequent Change of Government, not so much on account of the Nature of the Crime, as the *Disaffection* of the *Romans* to Kingly Government, for the repeated ill Usage they had met with; for had not the previous Abuses preceded, *Brutus* and *Collatinus* might either have sought Redress from his Father, or have conspir'd directly against the Person of the Ravisher; but without it they would never have had the Confidence to hope to expel them, and set *Rome*

* Liv. lib. 1.

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at *Liberty*, by the Assistance of the
Romans.

MANNERS and *Ways of Thinking*, repugnant to the Nature of Monarchical Government, constitute yet another *immediate Disposition*; * for no Kingdom can subsist long, when its Administration is disagreeable to the Temper of the Subjects. Their *Temper* proceeds chiefly from their Way of Thinking; so that if their Way of Thinking is repugnant to a *Monarchical Form*, the Temper of the Subjects will be likewise averse to that Form of Government, and will consequently become an *immediate Disposition* to alter the Form of Government of that Kingdom. The Manner or Way of Thinking proceeds chiefly from their Education, and a *Spirit of Liberty* gliding insensibly into the Mind. They that are always us'd to live under a *Monarchy*, are hardly capable of it, because they have already contracted an *Habit* of living in *Servitude*; but

* Arist. Pol. lib. 3. cap. ult.

if it enters accidentally, 'tis hard to get rid of it and prevent a *Change*, because the Habit of *Liberty* has supplanted that of *Servitude*; which (not to mention the *Ardour* with which every one is suppos'd to prosecute the *Common Good*) is greatly instrumental in confirming *Union* among the *Subjects*, and vigorous Resolutions in the Cause of *Liberty*.

IT should be consider'd, that *immediate Dispositions* do not start up in Kingdoms in their full Maturity, but slide in gradually, and grow insensibly to a Heighth; every Day contributes its Mite, and therefore a constant good Guard and Application are necessary.

WE must consider, in the next Place, that it is the hardest Matter in the World *to know them in their Infancy*, for few (and they the wisest of Men) are capable of that; but they are easiest remedy'd then, and hinder'd from making any farther Progress: When *they are full grown*, every one sees and
knows

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knows them ; but 'tis a Task too difficult and hazardous for almost any one to root them out. * If the Power of the *Prince* in this Case is not superior to the *Evil* introduc'd, or if it is otherwise employ'd in a difficult War, the most prudent Method he can follow is *to temporize*, and not to run headlong against it without Fear or Wit; for great Advantages are commonly receiv'd from watching of *Opportunities*, either because the Inclination of the Subjects to the *strongest Party* may dye away: or because the Passion of the Party that is *resolv'd on a Change* may subside, or at least grow luke-warm: or because the *Disaffection* to the present Government may be mitigated, or check'd: or because the Distaste conceiv'd by the *Subjects* against Monarchical Government may diminish, or be entirely remov'd: or because the Manners and Notions repugnant to the Nature of Monarchy may be eradicated, or may spend themselves.

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 8.

IT is farther worth Notice, that the *immediate Dispositions* are more necessary to effect a *Change*, than all the other Incidents put together; for it signifies nothing, tho' the *Cause that sets the Machine a moving*, the *End that persuades*, the *Opportunity which paves the Way*, the *Subjects equal to the Undertaking*, the *Incentives that stimulate it*, and the *Means that facilitate*, do all concur, if the *State* which is to be transform'd is not dispos'd for it. All Endeavours must prove needless where the *Subject* is unprepar'd; and therefore if some one or other of the fore-mention'd *Dispositions* is not previously introduc'd into that *State*, no *Change* will ensue, tho' all other Requisites should co-incide; and whosoever attempts it, will, doubtless, not only lose his Time and Labour, but generally his *Life* into the Bargain. Lastly, tho' the *immediate Dispositions* are so necessary for this Purpose, yet, if any of the other Circumstances should fail, it will be hard to effect a *Change*, as will appear manifestly from the following Instances.

THE

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THE first Thing that occurs to us in the Murder of *Servius*, is * *Tarquinius's End*, usurping the Kingdom: then the *Cause* that incited him to it, which was his Hatred to *Servius*: next, the *Occasion* that pav'd the Way to it, which was a Discovery of a Secret of State, viz. his Knowledge of *Servius's* Weakness (want of Forces) and the small Assistance to be expected from his Subjects. What *qualify'd Tarquinius* to effect the *Change*, was his *Birth*, and being ally'd to the *Royal Family*. The *Means* by which he brought it about, were Persuasions, Promises, and Donatives: the *Incentive* that provok'd him, was, the Instigation of his *Wife*: and the *immediate Disposition*, was, his having bow'd the Hearts of almost the whole People by his Artifices.

IN the Expulsion of *Tarquin* we see the *End* for which it was attempted, namely, † the Ruin of the Monarchi-

* Liv. lib. 1.

† Idem ibid.

cal Form of Government: the *Cause* that prompted *Brutus* and *Collatinus* to act, which was the Injury receiv'd: the *Opportunity* that pav'd the Way, was the rising of the People in Arms, occasion'd by the Nature of the Injury, which might have prov'd any Citizen's Case: the *Quality* that render'd *Brutus* and *Collatinus* proper to effect the Change, were the Number of their Partizans: the *Means* that facilitated the Enterprize, were the Pre-possession of the People in their Favour: the *Incentive* that stimulated them to it, was their knowing the general Aversion that the People had to *Tarquin*: and the *immediate Disposition*, was the People's Dislike to Monarchy, which made them resolve never to submit to Kingly Government again.

THE *End* which made * *Otho* aspire to the Empire, was to usurp the Throne: the *Cause* was the Contempt that *Galba* had fallen under on account of his great Age: *Otho's* personal *Qualities*

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

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were his Ambition and Discontent: the *Stimulus* was the Necessity to which *Otho* was reduc'd, and the Predictions of *Ptolomy* the Astrologer: the *Means* were his corrupting the Army with Donatives to obtain their Affection, and render *Galba* more hateful and contemptible: the *Opportunity* was the passing of the Empire from one Family to another which was not call'd to succeed by Right of Inheritance: and the *immediate Disposition* was the strongest Party's (the Army) being determin'd for a Change, and provok'd by the rigorous Proceedings of *Galba*.

* *VESPASIAN'S End* in attempting to dispossess *Vitellius*, was the seizing of the Empire: the *Cause* was the Contempt that *Vitellius* labour'd under: the *Opportunity* was the Alteration of the Armies Quarters occasion'd by the Civil War between *Otho* and *Vitellius*: the *Quality* that render'd *Vespasian* a proper Instrument, was his command-

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 2.

ing the Eastern Legions: the *Stimulus* was the Persuasion of *Mutianus*: the *Means* were his bringing over the Soldiers and their Officers to his Side: and the *immediate Disposition* was the general Inclination for *Vespasian*.

ON the other hand, the *Effect* did not follow when any of the before-mention'd *Circumstances* fail'd: * *Brutus* and *Cassius* pretended to restore *Rome* to her ancient *Liberty* by murdering *Cæsar*, which was their *End*: the *Cause* was the Hatred to the *Usurper*: the *Quality* which fitted them for that Purpose was, that *Brutus* and *Cassius* were Men of Credit, and had many Followers: the *Incentive* was their Knowledge of the Aversion that the *leading Men of Rome* had to *Cæsar's* Government: the *Means* were the Persuasions and Suggestions which they us'd, to draw in the rest of the Conspirators: the *Opportunity* was, the Discovery of *Cæsar's* Weakness on account of his being hated by the principal

* Sueton. in Cæsar.

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Romans. *Cæsar's* Death ensu'd; but the Recovery of their *Liberty*, which was to be the *Effect*, did not follow, because the *immediate Disposition* necessary to induce the new Form of Government did not answer; for there was not only wanting a *Disaffection* to *Monarchical Government*, but *Cæsar* was by the Generality belov'd: and *Manners* or *Notions* repugnant to that Form of Government were not only wanting, but they happen'd to be more inclin'd in their Hearts to *Servitude*, and to live in direct Opposition to a Republican Form, or Popular Scheme.

SEJANUS attempted to dethrone *Tiberius*; that was his *End* that mov'd him: the *Cause* that set him at Work was his Contempt of *Tiberius*, occasion'd by the Advantage he had of contriving his Ruin: the *Quality*, which made it probable he would succeed, was his Command of the * *Prætorians* and the Authority he had over *Ti-*

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

berius himself: his profound *Artifices* have been already mention'd; his *Stimulus* was his confirm'd Hope of accomplishing his Wish by the Help of the great Power he enjoy'd; yet he miss'd his Aim, and was ruin'd with all these Advantages on his Side, for no other Reason, but because the *Opportunity* fail'd him.

TIBERIUS was a Person that took the greatest Care in the World to *avoid* popular Insurrections: he quell'd the Mutinies in his *Armies* with admirable Address: he guarded with singular Dexterity against continuing ambitious and suspected *Persons* in *important Posts*; or rather, watch'd all their Proceedings with the utmost *Circumspection*: he industriously fought all Opportunities of stifling the Growth of new *religious Sects* in the Bud: he eluded the Factions of the *Powerful* with exquisite Conduct: he conceal'd the *Secrets* of State with great *Prudence*: he dissembled his own *Weakness* with consummate Cunning, and crush'd *Se-*

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janus in particular by the most uncommon Stratagems.

* CLEANDER made the same Attempt on the Emperor *Commodus*: his *End* likewise was the Usurpation of the Throne: his main *Motive* was his Contempt of the *Emperor*, arising from his Power to injure him: what render'd him a Person proper to aim at a Revolution, was the great *Post* he enjoy'd: the concomitant *Stimulus* was the Hopes he had conceiv'd of the Practicableness of the Enterprize: the different *Means* he practis'd to ingratiate himself with the *Commons*, were his erecting publick Schools, Baths, and laying up great Quantities of Corn to distribute among the *People* when it was scarce: he was likewise favour'd by a popular Insurrection; yet for all this, none of the *immediate Dispositions* contributing to assist him (neither a *general Dissatisfaction* with *Commodus's* Government, nor a *general Inclination*

* Herod. lib. 3.

to fet him up for Emperor, or a *Resolution of the strongest Party to Change*) he fell short of his Wish, and ruin'd both himself and his Friends.

IT is then manifest, that if any of the mention'd *Requisites* had been wanting, a *Revolution* could never be brought about in a Monarchical Government, or it must have been with the greatest Difficulty, when attempted. It is likewise plain, that the foremention'd *immediate Dispositions* are more necessary to effect a Change than all the remote ones put together: Now it remains only to consider the *Marks* and *Indications* of those *Dispositions*, that assoon as they are apparent in any State, all suitable Vigilance may be had, the necessary Caution be taken, and wholesome seasonable Remedies be apply'd.

THE principal *Indications* of the *People's* being inclin'd to espouse any one Subject, are, their having *Recourse immediately to him* in a Time of general

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ral Calamity; their depending *absolutely on his Pleasure* in publick Determinations; their *choosing him Leader* in important Differences between them and the Prince; their *interesting themselves sensibly* in all Affairs relating to him, and being *ready at his Beck*.

THE chief Signs of the *strongest Party's* having come to a *Resolution to change*, are, their *Backwardness* in point of Obedience; their *Earnestness* in *searching for Pretexts* to break with the Prince upon the minutest Occasion; their *Contempt* of the Prince and his *Ministers*, and their demanding such Things as are either highly *prejudicial* to the Prince, or are hardly to be put in Execution, or are not usually comply'd with.

THE *principal Marks* of the *People's* being dissatisfy'd with the present *Administration*, are, their not indulging and bearing with the Prince so much as is necessary, and he has a
Right

Right to; their omitting the publick *Demonstrations of Joy* in Honour of the Prince; their envying those who *liv'd in former Reigns*; their rejoycing at his *Misfortunes*; their imputing all Mal-Administration and *Faults committed by others to his Score*; their withdrawing from *Court*; their levying the ordinary usual Taxes with great *Reluctance*; *complaining openly of his Government*; and essaying to put themselves under the Protection of any *Foreigner*, no matter who.

THE most remarkable Signs of *Notions* being crept in among Subjects that are *repugnant to Monarchy*, are, their discovering that the *Institutions and Laws* hitherto observ'd by them are become insupportable; actual Backwardness *in paying Obedience* to them; their meddling in publick Affairs with greater Licence than is proper for them; and attempting to stand up for *Liberty*.

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THE chief *Indications* of Dissatisfaction with *Kingly Government*, are, an *Aversion* to all the King orders or *appoints to be done*; the abandoning the Pursuit of those Things which conduce to the improving the Royal Revenue; and a strict *Union* between *Parties formerly Enemies*.

'TIS plain that * *Tiberius* discover'd and apply'd a seasonable Remedy to the *general Inclination* shewn for *Sejanus*, by the fore-mention'd Signs. † We find the same *Sign* of the *Resolution* of the *strongest Party* to change, by the mutinying of the *German Legions* under the Command of *Germanicus*. The *Marks of popular Impatience* under a present Administration, are visible under the Reigns of *Tiberius*, *Nero*, and particularly under *Caracalla*, when the *Romans* voluntarily set up ‡ *Macrinus* for Emperor, with-

* Sueton. in Tiber.

† Tacit. Annal. lib. 1.

‡ Dion. in Macrin.

out knowing any thing of him. The same Marks of *Manners repugnant to Monarchy*, and a general *Disaffection to it*, are visible in the *Roman History* in the Time of * *Tarquinius Superbus*.

* Liv. lib. i.





C H A P. XII.

Concerning the Effects of Change in a
MONARCHY.

ALL Revolutions of Kingdoms produce vast Events big with Labour and Importance; for, as they are unavoidable by the Government while it is in a State of *Change*, and go hand in hand with it when it puts off its original *Form*, 'tis impossible they should happen without popular Com-motions (as * *Tigranes* told *Cyrus*) and Tumults, pernicious both to the *publick* and to *private Persons*, as † *Nicocles* told his *Subjects*. They affect numberless Persons, incommode every one, and put every thing into Confusion: So true it is, that tho' the *Change*

* Xenoph. Cyrop. lib. 3.

† Isoc. in Nicoc.

may be for the better, yet are all of them full of Sollicitude, and necessarily attended with a thousand *Acts of Injustice*; as * *Plato*, writing to the Friends and Relations of *Dion*, demonstrates by the Example of the Change of Government that happen'd at *Athens*; and may be very particularly discover'd in the *Change* that was made at † *Ephesus* by *Alexander's* Order; when the *Oligarchy* was convert-ed into a *Republick*, whence memorable Disorders ensu'd; and greater would in all Probability have happen'd, if *Alexander* had not interpos'd in Time.

THE Effects of the Change of Government in a Kingdom are, without Comparifon, the greateft and moft miserable that can happen, as they are constantly attended with Blood, Violence, Deaths, Expulfion of Princes, Destruction of their Relations, Ruin of their Friends and Followers, and

* Plat. Epist. 7.

† Arrian. lib. 1.

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the Crushing, or the Exile of those who stood in any ways well affected to the Government.

WHEN a * Monarchical *Form* is chang'd for a Popular one, the *People* are apt to run from one Extreme to another, and prefer unbridled *Licence* to *Liberty*; this proves the Source of numerous Wrongs and Rapine, by its ending in the Persecution of the *Rich*, the Expulsion of the *Nobility*, the Oppression of Men of the *greatest Worth*, the making of the *Mob* Interpreters of the *Law*, and the reducing all to one wretched Standard of *Equality*.

IF the Government changes to an *Oligarchy*, 'tis setting up more *Tyrants* in the Place of *one*, giving Scope to *Might*, *Avarice* and *Ambition*, and making the whole Government subservient to their Interest, by the Opportunity it gives to abuse and oppress the *Body of the People*, and reduce

* Guicciard. lib. 1.

them

them to a State of downright *Servitude*.

IF a Person without any *just Title* gets into the *Throne*, he proves generally a cruel and terrible *Tyrant*, a Subverter of the *Law*, the Bane of *Liberty*, the *Disturber* of Tranquillity, the Destroyer of Life, and one that looks on the Honour of his *Subjects* as a * *contemptible Thing*, and comprehends all the baneful Ills of the worst of *Republicks*, and most arbitrary *Oligarchy*. How is it possible that he should govern a Kingdom by *virtuous Means*, who purchas'd it by Robbery and Violence, as *Piso* said to the *Prætorian Soldiers* that *Otho* had excited to rebel against *Galba*? How can he establish his Throne by any but *Sanguinary Methods*? How can he satisfy those that have assisted him, without it be by the *Rewards of Injustice*, and robbing others of their Honours and Properties? Thus, by injuring and reducing great Numbers to *Despair*,

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

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he must of Necessity stand in *Fear* of them, and of Consequence exercise great *Cruelties* to set himself free from that *Passion*. * He will prefer his *private* Interest to the *publick* Good, for he will steer his Course by that *only Point*: Not *Honour*, but his *Pleasure*, will be the *Object* of his *Actions*; therefore he will govern to the Ruin of the Subjects: He will stand in awe of Men of *Courage*, for fear they should murder him; of Men of *Ability*, for fear they should conspire against him; and of Men of † *Probity*, because he must be persuaded that the *Multitude* would rather live under *their* Administration than *his*: He will foment *Differences* among Men of Power, to divert them from uniting against him: He will propagate Envy among the ‡ *Nobility*, Enmity among the *Rich*, and *Discord* among Friends, that they may not joyn against him: He will endeavour to set the *Nobles*

* Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10.

† Xenoph. in Tyran.

‡ Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 11.

and

and *Commons* at Variance, lest they should plot his Ruin: He will oppress the * *wretched People* by his Extortion to supply his necessary Expences, which must be excessive, on account of his being oblig'd to keep a *Standing Army of Mercenaries* on foot to defend him, as if he were continually engag'd in War: His constant Study will be to *impoverish the Subjects*, in order to dispirit them, and incapacitate them for throwing of the *Yoke*: He will discourage *Industry* and *Arts*, and whatsoever may beget Affability, Correspondence, or Confidence among them: He will saddle the Multitude with continu'd but different Sorts of *Impositions* and personal *Burdens*, that the Thoughts of freeing themselves from a *Tyrannical Servitude* may never once enter into their Minds: He will crush the *Nobility*, disperse Men of *Worth*, and look on both as his dangerous Enemies. In short, his sole Aim will be to break the *Hearts of his Subjects*, that no Slave may ever

* Xenoph. in Tyr.

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dare to lift up his Hand against him. He'll promote Jealousies and mutual Suspicion, because there's no opposing such an enormous *Evil*, except they *trust in one another*, and so reduce them to the worst of all Conditions; for none will have the Assurance to attempt to rescue himself, because he must look on it as impossible.

BESIDES, under his *Administration* * nothing will be felt but perpetual Accusations, harsh Commands, feign'd Friendships, and betraying of innocent Persons; † innumerable Barbarities will be practis'd; Nobility, Wealth, Honours, and, what is more, even *Virtue* † itself, will be reckon'd *criminal*. Favours anciently granted will be cancell'd, known *Privileges* broken through, granted Immunities will be resum'd, standing Laws abrogated, and all manner of Order and Discipline disconcerted. *Informers* will be encourag'd, *Spies* rewarded with

* Tacit. Annal. lib. 4.

† Idem Hist. lib. 1.

Honours, Servants brib'd to betray their *Masters*, Children their Parents, and they who have no Enemies will be ruin'd by their very Friends; all Places will be fill'd with *Spies* and *In-formers*, Cities possess'd with the Fear of Death, the Sea with Exiles, and the Rocks besmear'd with Blood.

SINCE *Revolutions* are so fatal to Subjects, how much more pernicious must they be to the Authors, who, by such consummate Rashness and Villany, purchase Death, Destruction, eternal Infamy, and Dishonour? If *Conspirators* run so great a Risque by reason of their encountring such Perils in the Management, Execution, and the Consequences of it, how much more Danger must there be in conducting a Revolution, wherein the *End* propos'd is either usurping the Throne, or changing the Form of Government? It is an Enterprize of the greatest Moment, and, without Comparison fraught with Hazards more complicated and inevitable; hence some have dy'd in the Attempt, like *Sejanus*; others
after

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after it has been farther advanc'd, tho' not perfected, like *Brutus* and *Cassius*; and some even after they have met with Success in the Execution, such as *Otho* and *Vitellius*. 'Tis most certain, that out of such a Number of impious Wretches, who, thro' all the different Ages of the World, have had Impudence to undertake them, very few have succeeded; and none of those who have had that good Fortune, have been able to save their Lives, or avoid eternal Disgrace. No Wonder, since they have had the Assurance to tread the Abyss of Infamy, and the Verge of Ruin.

KINGS, and their *Defenders*, merit endless Honour and Glory; what Wonder then, that the Movers of *Change*, and Overturers of *Kingdoms*, should be stigmatiz'd with everlasting Blame and Reproach? How cautiously ought they to steer to avoid those dangerous Rocks, the *Spies* and *Informers*? When they come to the Execution, how hard the Task, to humble *Royalty* surrounded with *Majesty* and
Power;

Power; and after the impious Work is done, to get the better of the Relations, Partizans, Friends, and Subjects of the expell'd or murder'd Prince; all of them fierce and obstinate Enemies? What Wonder (I say) that so few meet with Success; and that they who do, lose the Reward of their Tyranny at the last?

It has been evidently made out, that Revolutions are most destructive to the *People*, most dangerous to their *Authors*, and exceedingly difficult (or rather impossible) to be successfully executed, because so many *essential Requisites* should combine, that it is not to be expected they can, at the same Article of Time; and yet if any of them fail, there's an End of the whole Project. A Man may indeed go about to sow Discontent among the *People*, with an Intention to dispose them to *Sedition*; but it is almost impossible that one Man's Life-time should be sufficient to *corrupt them* to that Degree, that he should reap the Fruit of his impious Design.

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WHEN Subjects are accustom'd to Monarchical Government, 'tis hardly practicable for *one Man*, suppos'd to be tolerably stricken in Years, to introduce Notions inconsistent with *Monarchy*, and to establish *Republican Maxims* within the short Time he has to live; and if it were possible to do it within that Time, yet, considering how human Affairs are carry'd on, it would be impracticable on that Score. Men very hardly brook any Delay in what they have set their Hearts altogether upon accomplishing, and are apt to deceive themselves in what they desire most; so that, whether it be thro' *Impatience*, or *Over-sights committed*, their Purposes are frustrated. To call it barely *Purpose*, is giving the Attempt too mild a Compellation; it ought to have been call'd a * *detestable Piece of Sacrilege*, and of so heinous a Nature, that it is more hateful and unpardonable before God, than any other Crime whatsoever.

* Ecclesiast. c. 10.

Besides the numerous Mischiefs and Enormities that it necessarily implies, it usurps one incommunicable *Property* of Divine Power, by which alone Kingdoms and Sceptres are erected, subsisted, and destroy'd; by which alone they change from one Form of Government to another, are transferr'd from one Family to another, and from one Nation to another People. Who then would be so madly rash to attempt a Revolution, when he must do it at the Expence of committing the most horrid Sacrilege?

SUPPOSE the *End* propos'd to be the Ruin of the *Prince*, it is manifest that the Author must run the same Risk himself; perhaps 'tis the Possession of the Throne that he aims at; such arduous *Flights* as these are not only dangerous, but commonly attended with *Falls*: Suppose the *Recovery of Liberty* is the End propos'd, even in that Case a Door is open'd for Myriads of worse Evils to enter at, than the rigidest and most insupportable *Slavery* affords: Perhaps the *Redress*

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dress of Grievances, or Delivery from Oppression, is the Occasion of it ; even here, the very Maladies you strive to avoid, have an Opportunity of seizing the Patient, and, what is worse, without any Hopes of Cure. If the Prince escapes with Life, and prevails, the high Provocation renders him more cruel and insufferable ; if he and his Party are crush'd, the Modelling of the new Government creates infinite Discord ; and if he usurps the Throne who was the Cause of the Prince's Fall, 'tis natural to imagine that he will lay a much greater Load of Servitude on the Subjects Shoulders, for fear others should mete the same Measure to him that he has done to his Prince.

NOR ought any other Cause to prevail with a Man to be guilty of so villanous and sacrilegious a Resolution: Not * *Wrongs receiv'd* ; for as Snow, Hail, and Frost, and the other Inclemencies of Heaven are suffer'd, so, by

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

Parity of Reason, ought we to bear with the Injuries done by the *Prince*. The *Shield*, and not the *Sword*, is the Weapon to be us'd in this Quarrel; or rather, considering the Distance between the *Injurer* and the *Injured*, all Resentment ought to be laid aside, and the unreasonable Passion of *Revenge* utterly extinguish'd. Neither ought *Fear* to excite any one to Rebellion, for the *Prince* is a common Father to all, and as such, never hurts his *Subjects* (I might have said, his *Children*) without just and weighty Reasons for it; and as 'tis in every one's Power to cloath himself with his Innocence, there he may ride fearless during the Storm of his *Master's* Anger. Nor should *Hatred* prove the Motive; for we ought to wish for * good Princes, and be contented with the worst: no, nor *Contempt*; because a Prince can never be guilty of so much Weakness and Baseness, on whom the Majesty of Empire will not reflect Lustre, or who will not

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 4.

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be able to get the better of any one Subject.

IT may be pretended, that a first *Minister*, who is the *Fac totum* in a Kingdom, or the General, or that a Person in whom both these Powers center, is best qualify'd to effect a *Revolution*; but they do not consider, that the Obedience of both the *Subjects* and the *Army*, is owing to their Belief of the *Minister's* acting only for the Service and Advantage of the *Prince*; but that as soon as ever the Subjects come to be convinc'd of the contrary, all their Efforts will soon be employ'd to humble the *Sacrilegious Traitor*. Should it be suggested, that such and such a Person is qualify'd, because he has good Store of Followers, Relations, and Wealth in the Kingdom; may it not as rationally be expected that his Partizans will abandon him, his Relations become his Enemies, and his Riches signify nothing, when the People are appriz'd of his impious Purpose? If 'tis imagin'd that such a One is qualify'd, be-

cause

cause *he turns and winds his Prince as he pleases*, and wants nothing but the *Sceptre* to compleat his Power, let him think on *Pescennius, Plautianus, Sejanus*, and the wretched *Exit* that many such as *they* generally make, and then correct his *inordinate Desires*, or, to speak more properly, his *Madness*. If his being descended from *rebellious Ancestors* is the Motive, let him think on *Classicus*, and many others, who built on the same Foundation, and perish'd severally in their Attempts: or why should he not rather endeavour to blot out the *Memory of their Perfidy* by his own faithful Attachment, than run headlong into such unavoidable Danger? If his near Relation to his Prince incites him, methinks so near a Tye should with-hold him; especially when 'tis consider'd, that they who aim too high, fall so much the lower with eternal Infamy. If one's Pretension to the Crown is what encourages him, why should not the Impracticableness of the Design divert him? or rather, why does he not wait an Opportunity of obtaining that Right

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(by taking more just Measures) which his Reason tells him is his Due?

CERTAIN it is, that the Introduction of Sectaries, the Pretending to defend Liberty, the Force of Persuasion, a thorow Insight into the Sacrilegious Trade of Arms, the Pretext of being vested with the Character of Ambassador, are as poor and scandalous *Means*, as they are dangerous and fatal.

No Motive ought to prevail with a Man in his sober Senses to undertake such an Enterprize: The *Instigation of a Friend* ought to byass no one in an Affair of so great Consequence, and beset with so many Deaths. They must not all expect to be favour'd, like *Vespasian*, with such a Number of happy Circumstances; they must not all expect to find their Friends, like *Mutianus*, equally well qualify'd for Persuasion and powerful Assistance; nor will it be an easy Matter to find any State exactly in the same Disposition that the *Roman Empire* was at that Time.

IT

IT may be alledg'd, that there is a *Necessity for it*; but certainly there can never happen such a Species of Necessity, as shall oblige a Man to expose himself voluntarily, to Death and eternal Dishonour. Perhaps it may be alledg'd, that the Prince is *notoriously and universally hated*, and therefore, &c. but if this is the Case of a *Natural Prince*, must not an *Usurper* expect to be in much worse Circumstances? *Certainty of Success* may be alledg'd; but how is that *Certainty* to be reconcil'd with the infallible Certainty of final Destruction?

No Stress is to be laid on these Partizans, who mind nothing but how to fish in troubled Waters; or on those, who joyn only for the sake of Honours and Preferments, or on the Needy and Necessitous, or on the Irresolute and Vain; those who are studious of Novelty, those who court Danger, and those who hope to satisfy their implacable Hatred conceiv'd against particular

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cular Persons; they are all Men naturally unfit for any such Business, and would rather turn tail at the least Rebuke: Nor are they to be depended upon, who have been injur'd by their Prince, because they precipitate Matters without considering how to put them in Execution.

THE Concurrence of *Opportunity* will signify but little, considering that no lasting Succour is to be expected from *Popular Insurrections* or the Mutinies of Armies, whose Passion to act is of short Continuance, and their Support but feeble: they are all Fire and Fury at the first Onset; but when *Fear* enters, straight their Passion subsides, and they are all Submission and Obedience: the promis'd *Aid* vanishes proportionably as they return to the natural Esteem they ought to have for their Prince: their *Rage* evaporates with the first Heat, and the *Love* they express'd is turn'd into Hatred, as soon as they come to discover their Error.

LONG

LONG Continuance in great Posts paves a Way to Revolutions; but 'tis a rugged one, fill'd with inextricable Difficulties. The Translation of a Kingdom from one *Family to another, not succeeding Hereditarily*, can never succeed, let the People be never so unanimously resolv'd on the *Change*; on the contrary, it rather betrays the Author to Destruction, as may be seen in the Case of the Emperor *Otho*. Nor is there any Solidity in the Support, or Faith to be repos'd in those who abandon *Religion*, to follow a *Phantom* of their own Erection.

NOTWITHSTANDING the Disadvantage of a Prince's being under Age, and subject to a Regency, many of them have, even in these Circumstances, made their Parties good, and brought the Rebels to condign Punishment. The *Leading Men of a Kingdom* may be disunited for some Time; but when once they discover that *Another* is going to take the Advantage of their Disagreement, to usurp the

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the Throne, all Differences are made up to defeat his Purpose. *Revealing of Secrets of State* does not necessarily strengthen the Enemies of the Crown; nor can a Prince be ever reduc'd so low, as to become a Prey to any one of his Subjects. There's no necessary Connexion between the Distance of a Prince from his Dominions, and the Rebellion of his Subjects; especially considering that the Neighbourhood of Foreign Troops does not imply an absolute Assurance of Success.

SUPPOSE the Affections of the Subjects were *generally set on one Man*, he can never hope to inspire them with his Ambition, and bring about a Change of Government by the Means of that *immediate Disposition*; for he must be sensible that he will not only be forsaken, but universally abhorr'd, when his Tyrannical Purpose comes to light, and the same good Inclinations turn'd to Disdain and Hatred when the Mask is pull'd off, without any Regard had to past good Offices, which are all believ'd to be accounted for,
and

and overpay'd by the intended *Impo-
sition*.

SHOULD any One hope fondly for
Success from the notorious *Impatience
of the People under a present Admini-
stration*, and depend upon being uni-
versally follow'd and obey'd; let him
consider, that the Passion for *Change*,
which is the Result of the Subject's
Impatience, cools in a very short Time,
and that the settled *Notion* which it
produc'd, of believing the Government
to be *the worst of all Governments*, is
not always accompany'd with *Despair*,
and that it gradually dies away.

IF any One, upon discovering the
*Resolution of the most powerful Part
to Change*, should persuade himself of
Success; let him reflect, that the most
inconsiderable Incidents have been
capable of turning the *Inclinations of
the stronger Party*: * *Galba* might
easily have diverted that violent Reso-

* Tacit. Hist. lib. 1.

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lution of the *Army*, if he had offer'd them the smallest Donative.

LET no One be perswaded into a fatal Security, and think himself able to change the Form of the Government because the *People* are Enemies to *Monarchy*, by taking it for granted that they are bent upon delivering themselves from *Servitude*, and that they will always be ready at his Call, who pretends to restore them to *Liberty*; for he ought to know, that 'tis the hardest Matter in the World to find out the *exact Proportion of Dissatisfaction* necessary to change the *Form of Government*. The Age of any one Man is insufficient for this; for Thousands of cruel and dangerous Obstructions must be first encounter'd, while he treads the utmost Verge of a Precipice before he can effect what he proposes.

NOR ought any One to think, because he knows that such *Republican Notions* are entertain'd as are *destructive to Monarchy*, that its *Form* may be

be easily chang'd, by concluding erroneously that a State cannot subsist long, which does not suit the Temper and Inclinations of the Subjects; for one must be blind who does not perceive, that to compass an Enterprize so hardly practicable, many more Heads are requir'd than one. Superlative Industry, great Authority, exquisite Prudence, exact Caution, continual Vigilance, a fix'd Resolution, and insuperable Perseverance, are all *Requisites: Qualities*, so numerous and uncommon, that it is next to impossible, all should center compleatly in the same *Subject*.

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